



Office of the Chair

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**Remarks by Chair Lina M. Khan  
as Prepared for Delivery  
Harvard Center for Labor and a Just Economy**

**February 21, 2024**

Good afternoon, everyone. I'm so thrilled to be here in conversation with you all—thanks so much to Professor Sachs for the kind words and to the staff who shouldered the laboring oar to make this event happen. It's also so great to be here alongside Professor Block, whose commitment to public service on behalf of the hardworking people of this country is a real inspiration. I'd like to share a few thoughts to kick things off, and then look forward to the conversation.

The FTC is not traditionally thought of as an agency that shapes workers' rights, but my guess is that many of you in this room understand very well that it is. Since stepping into the role of Chair, I have been reminded, over and over, of the ways that the FTC's decisions deeply and directly affect the well-being of people who work for a living. At our open commission meetings and out on the road, through our comment dockets and through letters to the Commission, we've heard time and again how business practices that the FTC oversees are affecting workers. We've heard, for example:

How in some regions the dominant health system has bought out all the major hospitals, such that nurses now live in fear of being blacklisted by the local monopoly, chilling their ability to file complaints or organize their workplace.<sup>1</sup>

How female drivers in the long-haul trucking industry find themselves stuck in unsafe situations because of coercive contractual terms that effectively force them to choose between putting up with harassment or foregoing their paycheck.<sup>2</sup>

How screenwriters working in an increasingly consolidated and vertically integrated entertainment industry now face no competing offers for their work—resulting in pay that is a tiny fraction of what they earned 15 years ago, even when they write major hits and deliver huge windfalls for the studios.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Comment Submitted by Nat'l Nurses United, Draft Merger Guidelines for Public Comment, *Regulations.gov* (Sept. 19, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0043-1485>.

<sup>2</sup> Comment Submitted by REAL Women in Trucking, Non-Compete Clause Rule, *Regulations.gov* (May 3, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0007-21019>.

<sup>3</sup> Comment Submitted by Jane Lee, Draft Merger Guidelines for Public Comment, *Regulations.gov* (Jul. 26, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0043-0477>.

How casino workers who were told they would be fired if they didn't sign a noncompete clause then watched working conditions worsen and found themselves blocked from taking a job with a better employer in the same town.<sup>4</sup> As one casino worker wrote in a comment to the FTC: "This is not the American dream, to be owned/controlled by corporations."<sup>5</sup>

Labor law has long recognized that intrinsic asymmetries of power in the workplace can give rise to exploitation, coercion, and abuse. But as markets across our economy have become more consolidated—and business models that concentrate control and profits while shedding risk and liability have proliferated—we hear similar stories of exploitation, coercion, and abuse even outside the traditional workplace.

Franchisee owners, for example, tell us that dominant franchisors can dictate terms despite their nominal independence<sup>6</sup>—accounts that echo what we hear from gig workers subject to the whims of a digital platform. Poultry farmers who have just a single processor they can sell to live in such fear of retaliation that some even refuse to share their concerns privately with the government—a reality I saw first-hand over a decade ago when entering this field as a business journalist.

A basic tenet of the American experiment is that real liberty means freedom from economic coercion and from the arbitrary, unaccountable power that comes with economic domination. You all are extremely well versed in the ways that labor law is an essential ingredient in securing this freedom. I want to offer that antitrust law and competition policy should also be viewed as key tools for securing real economic liberty, checking economic domination, and protecting all Americans—including American workers—from coercion.

Just as the Constitution created checks and balances in our system of governance to safeguard against concentrations of political power, Congress wrote the antitrust laws to create checks and balances in our commercial sphere, to protect us from concentrations of *economic* power and the coercion it can enable.

In the run up to the Sherman Act's passage in 1890, Senator John Sherman observed that, "The law of selfishness, uncontrolled by competition ... commands the price of labor without fear of strikes."<sup>7</sup> In crafting the 1914 FTC Act, lawmakers sought to "secure labor the highest wage, [and] the largest amount of employment under the most favorable conditions and circumstances."<sup>8</sup> Labor-protective provisions in the Clayton Act passed just a month later "gave laboring people" a "bill of rights" and a "magna carta."<sup>9</sup> Twenty years later, in 1935, Congress

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<sup>4</sup> Comment Submitted by Anonymous, Non-Compete Clause Rule, *Regulations.gov* (Mar. 2, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0007-6717>.

<sup>5</sup> *Id.*

<sup>6</sup> Comment Submitted by Anonymous, Solicitation for Public Comments on Provisions of Franchise Agreements and Franchisor Business Practices, *Regulations.gov* (May 1, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0026-0109>.

<sup>7</sup> 21 Cong. Rec. 2457 (1890).

<sup>8</sup> 51 Cong. Rec. 8854 (1914).

<sup>9</sup> 51 Cong. Rec. 9074 (1914).

passed the National Labor Relations Act, a watershed moment for securing workers' right to collectively organize and counter employer power.<sup>10</sup>

Whereas labor law primarily focuses on protecting workers' right to collectively bargain and organize for shared ends, antitrust law primarily determines the terms on which firms can compete and coordinate.<sup>11</sup> Whether and how we enforce the antitrust laws can be the difference between:

Workers having the freedom to secure a better job in a tight labor market—or being blocked from opportunities that offer higher pay or better working conditions;

Workers having the freedom to attempt to organize their colleagues—or knowing that, if they're retaliated against, there are few, if any, places left to go just so that they can keep food on the table;

Workers having the freedom to play employers off each other when it is time to come to the table to renegotiate union contracts—or watching their bargaining leverage shrink as firms merge and labor markets consolidate;

Workers having the freedom to strike out on their own and start a new business—or being locked out of markets where monopolists get away with muscling out new entrants.

These are just a few of the ways that antitrust shapes and structures the ability of people of all walks of life to earn an honest living.

Through most of the last century, vigorous antitrust enforcement and competition policy were viewed as key tools for structuring markets where consumers, workers, and honest businesses could get a fair shake. As part of a broader philosophical shift in the 1980s, policymakers turned away from a deep commitment to maintaining open, competitive markets in favor of accepting more consolidation across the economy.

At the start of his term, President Biden announced a break with this approach. "We're now 40 years into the experiment of letting giant corporations accumulate more and more power," he said. "Rather than competing for consumers, [corporations] are consuming their competitors," and "rather than competing for workers, they're finding ways to gain the upper hand on labor," he said. "I believe the experiment failed."<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>10</sup> 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-169; *see also*, *National Labor Relations Act*, NLRB, <https://www.nlr.gov/guidance/key-reference-materials/national-labor-relations-act>, ("In 1935, Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act ('NLRA'), making clear that it is the policy of the United States to encourage collective bargaining by protecting workers' full freedom of association.").

<sup>11</sup> Sanjukta Paul, *Antitrust as Allocator of Coordination Rights*, 67 UCLA L. J. 4 (2020).

<sup>12</sup> Remarks by President Biden At Signing of An Executive Order Promoting Competition in the American Economy (July 9, 2021), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefing-room/speeches-remarks/2021/07/09/remarks-by-president-biden-at-signing-of-an-executive-order-promoting-competition-in-the-american-economy/>.

The FTC is on the front lines of reinvigorating enforcement of the antitrust laws. Our enforcement seeks to protect *all* Americans, including workers—an aspect of antitrust analysis that enforcers in recent decades had neglected.

Being successful in this work requires having a solid grasp of how labor markets actually work. That’s why one of my top priorities has been ensuring that we are regularly and systematically engaging with the public. Through open dockets, open commission meetings, and listening sessions across the country, we’ve heard directly from thousands of workers about their lived experiences. Rather than relying just on theories and models that assume perfect competition, we are rooting our work in empirical research and commercial realities—namely, the reality of how firms acquire and exercise power in the modern economy, and the reality of how workers are impacted.

While there is much more to be done, a few key areas already reflect the fruits of these efforts.

First is our work to safeguard against unlawful forms of consolidation that deprive workers of the benefits that labor market competition can bring.

A relatively new body of empirical research—some of it produced by those of you here today—has revealed that labor markets are far more concentrated than previously recognized, and that increased labor market concentration directly correlates with lower wages.<sup>13</sup>

Even in occupations with higher outward mobility, like bank tellers or counter attendants, recent estimates suggest that one in six workers face wage suppression as a result of employer concentration.<sup>14</sup> The Treasury Department estimated that labor market concentration accounts for a *20 percent* decrease in wages.<sup>15</sup> It is striking—shocking even—that America’s workers are making a fifth less than they should be in a more competitive, less consolidated economy.

One of the primary ways that consolidation occurs is through mergers. Mergers and acquisitions can enable dominant firms to further amass power over workers, small businesses, and communities. Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and acquisitions when the effect “may be substantially to lessen competition or tend to create a monopoly”—including competition for labor.<sup>16</sup>

Our new Merger Guidelines, published together with the Department of Justice and finalized this past December, lay out a framework for considering how a merger might lessen competition in labor markets—the first time that the merger guidelines have ever explicitly discussed labor.

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<sup>13</sup> See, e.g., José Azar, Ioana Marinescu, & Marshall Steinbaum, *Labor Market Concentration*, 57 J. HUM. RES. S167-S199 (2022).

<sup>14</sup> Gregor Schubert, Anna Stansbury, & Bledi Taska, *Employer Concentration and Outside Options*, SSRN, June 2020, at 31.

<sup>15</sup> DEPT. OF THE TREASURY, *THE STATE OF LABOR MARKET COMPETITION* (2022) at ii, <https://home.treasury.gov/system/files/136/State-of-Labor-Market-Competition-2022.pdf>.

<sup>16</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 18.

Informed by thousands of public comments—including many from workers and worker organizations<sup>17</sup>—the new Merger Guidelines recognize the realities of how labor market competition plays out and the various ways that workers can lose out when firms don’t have to vigorously compete for their labor.<sup>18</sup> When determining whether a firm has power within a labor market, for example, the Guidelines note that we will look at direct evidence of the merging firms’ power to cut or freeze wages, slow wage growth, exercise increased leverage in negotiations with workers, or generally degrade benefits and working conditions without prompting workers to quit. The Guidelines also note features of labor markets that make them unique. Searching for a place of employment is different from searching for a toaster to buy.<sup>19</sup> Workers may assess employers not just on pay and benefits but also on factors like the predictability of one’s schedule. The high switching costs and search frictions of labor markets can exacerbate how mergers affect workers, and the level of concentration at which competition concerns arise may be lower in labor markets than in product markets.

The new Merger Guidelines also make clear that mergers that lessen competition in labor markets cannot be redeemed through benefits provided to other market participants. Fidelity to the law means that we cannot subordinate worker harms to consumer benefits.

We must also be clear-eyed about the promises that merging companies make. Merger enforcement is inherently a predictive exercise, but the last 40 years provide a rich history from which we can learn. For example, merging companies will often claim that a merger will lead to expansion and increased direct employment, only for those promises to fall apart once a merger is consummated.<sup>20</sup> Layoffs, rather than job creation, have often been the norm.

Our merger analysis is also accounting for the differences between unionized and non-unionized workforces. We recognize, for example, how competition between employers can give unions greater leverage when bargaining over a new contract, allowing unions to play employers off one another to secure better terms. Competition can also position unions to more credibly threaten a strike, as a strike is more effective when an employer loses sales and customers to a

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<sup>17</sup> See, e.g., Comment Submitted by Serv. Emps. Int’l Union, Draft Merger Guidelines for Public Comment, *Regulations.gov* (Sept. 19, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0043-1537>; Comment Submitted by Nat’l Nurses United, Draft Merger Guidelines for Public Comment, *Regulations.gov* (Sept. 19, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0043-1485>; Comment Submitted by Writers Guild of Am. West & Am. Fed’n of Musicians, Draft Merger Guidelines for Public Comment, *Regulations.gov* (Mar. 2, 2023), <https://www.regulations.gov/comment/FTC-2023-0043-1460>.

<sup>18</sup> U.S. Dep’t of Justice and Fed. Trade Comm’n, Merger Guidelines: Draft for Public Comment Purposes (July 19, 2023), [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc\\_gov/pdf/p859910draftmergerguidelines2023.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/p859910draftmergerguidelines2023.pdf) (Guideline 11: When a Merger Involves Competing Buyers, the Agencies Examine Whether It May Substantially Lessen Competition for Workers or Other Sellers).

<sup>19</sup> Statement of Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya Joined by Chair Lina M. Khan and Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter Regarding the Proposed Merger Guidelines Issued by the Federal Trade Commission & U.S. Department of Justice (July 19, 2023), available at [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc\\_gov/pdf/p234000\\_merger\\_guidelines\\_statement\\_bedoya\\_final.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/p234000_merger_guidelines_statement_bedoya_final.pdf).

<sup>20</sup> For example, when pitching the Sprint/T-Mobile merger, the CEO of T-Mobile promised that the merger was “all about creating new, high-quality, high-paying jobs,” and that the merger would be “jobs positive on Day 1 and every day thereafter.” Within a year of the merger, the combined firm had undertaken waves of layoffs and on net had 5,000 fewer jobs. See Jasmine Hicks, *Sprint Merger Hasn’t Created Jobs — It’s Cut Thousands*, THE VERGE (Sept. 1, 2022), <https://www.theverge.com/2022/9/1/23333124/t-mobile-sprint-layoffs-5g-merger-jobs-promise>.

rival. Mergers that eliminate that competition among employers, meanwhile, can remove a key point of leverage for those unions.

When workers do strike—like the Writers Guild and SAG-AFTRA did for four months last year—consolidated industries may be better positioned to let unionized workers “bleed out,” as one industry veteran put it, before coming to the table.<sup>21</sup> Labor organizers tell us that they’ve seen first-hand how greater consolidation has enabled employers to coordinate labor strategies and align on tactics, dampening workers’ negotiating power. Indeed, antitrust law has long recognized that mergers can enable firms to coordinate with greater discipline, an insight that we should apply equally to our analysis of labor markets.

These are just some of the ways that the labor realities on the ground are shaping our merger analysis. And this past year, punctuated by historic strikes and a resurgence of labor organizing, offers a rich set of lessons on the relationship between market power and worker power that I’m sure many of you are exploring. Key questions remain, including empirical questions around how to weigh the tradeoff workers can face between leveraging mergers to secure commitments from companies that make life better for workers in the medium-term against the long-term loss in workers’ bargaining power that mergers can enable.

A second key pillar of our work is scrutinizing coercive contractual terms that can disempower workers and can amount to unfair methods of competition.

A defining feature of the U.S. labor market these last few years is how tight it has been, with unemployment at historic lows.<sup>22</sup> While these conditions should allow workers to leverage competition among employers to seek out higher pay and better benefits, a huge swath of workers has been contractually restricted from doing so.

In fact, as many as 30 million workers in this country are bound to their current employer by non-compete clauses in their employment contracts.<sup>23</sup> For these workers, who can range from fast food workers, hairstylists, and janitors to journalists, veterinarians, and engineers, changing jobs can be far from easy—it can require commuting hundreds of miles away from family, changing professions, or facing down your employer in court.

That’s one reason why a top priority for me has been to restore the agency’s mandate to safeguard American workers and businesses from unfair methods of competition—a core directive of the FTC Act.

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<sup>21</sup> Dominic Patten, *Hollywood Studios’ WGA Strike Endgame Is To Let Writers Go Broke Before Resuming Talks In Fall*, DEADLINE (July 11, 2023), <https://deadline.com/2023/07/writers-strike-hollywood-studios-deal-fight-wga-actors-1235434335/>.

<sup>22</sup> See Council of Econ. Advisers, *A Strong Year for the Labor Market*, THE WHITE HOUSE BLOG (Jan. 5, 2024), <https://www.whitehouse.gov/cea/written-materials/2024/01/05/a-strong-year-for-the-labor-market/>; see also Lydia DePillis, *Job Market Starts 2024 With a Bang*, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 2, 2024), <https://www.nytimes.com/2024/02/02/business/economy/jobs-report-january-2024.html>; J.J. McCorvey et al., *Covid Transformed the U.S. Labor Market, and It Isn’t Done Yet*, NBC NEWS (May 12, 2023), <https://www.nbcnews.com/business/economy/covid-pandemic-emergency-workforce-jobs-recession-rcna83412>.

<sup>23</sup> Evan P. Starr, James J. Prescott, & Norman D. Bishara, *Noncompete Agreements in the U.S. Labor Force*, 64 J.L. & ECON. 53, 53 (2021).

While the Sherman and Clayton Acts prohibit a whole set of trade practices, Section 5 of the FTC Act is unique in prohibiting *unfair* methods of competition.<sup>24</sup> The text of the statute is useful for making clear that the law distinguishes between *fair* and *unfair* ways of competing. Or as President Biden put it, “[I]f your employer wants to keep you, [they] should have to make it worth your while to stay. That’s the kind of competition that leads to better wages and greater dignity of work.”<sup>25</sup>

In 2022, the Commission issued a policy statement laying out how we will interpret “unfair methods of competition,” drawing on decades of case law and fidelity to the text, structure, and history of the statute.<sup>26</sup> And we subsequently brought lawsuits charging that certain employers’ use of noncompetes was an unfair method of competition, resulting in noncompetes being dropped for thousands of workers.<sup>27</sup> We then proposed a rule last January that would prohibit the vast majority of noncompetes in employment contracts.<sup>28</sup>

As our proposal lays out, eliminating noncompetes would free workers to pursue better, higher-paying jobs and, we estimate, would raise the wages of *all* workers—including those not directly covered by noncompetes—by up to 300 billion dollars a year.

We received over 22,000 public comments in response to our proposal—comments that recount devastating stories of how noncompetes have kept people locked into abusive jobs, forced them to uproot their families, or buried them in expensive litigation. We are in the process of fully learning from these comments and look forward to finalizing the rule in the coming months.

As we look to build on these efforts, we will continue to focus on the realities of how firms can exercise power over workers in the modern economy. We have seen the risks of business models and contractual arrangements that allow firms to outsource risk and liability to workers in the name of granting them autonomy and flexibility, even as the firms maintain outsized control. And we have seen how a permissive approach to vertical restraints and

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<sup>24</sup> 15 U.S.C. § 45.

<sup>25</sup> Remarks by President Biden At Signing of An Executive Order Promoting Competition in the American Economy, *supra* note 12.

<sup>26</sup> Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Restores Rigorous Enforcement of Law Banning Unfair Methods of Competition (Nov. 10, 2022), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/11/ftc-restores-rigorous-enforcement-law-banning-unfair-methods-competition>; *see also*, Statement of Chair Lina M. Khan Joined by Commissioner Rebecca Kelly Slaughter and Commissioner Alvaro M. Bedoya On the Adoption of the Statement of Enforcement Policy Regarding Unfair Methods of Competition Under Section 5 of the FTC Act (Nov. 10, 2022), *available at* <https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cases-proceedings/public-statements/statement-of-chair-khan-commissioners-slaughter-bedoya-on-policy-statement-regarding-section-5>.

<sup>27</sup> Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Cracks Down on Companies That Impose Harmful Noncompete Restrictions on Thousands of Workers (Jan. 4, 2023), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/01/ftc-cracks-down-companies-impose-harmful-noncompete-restrictions-thousands-workers>.

<sup>28</sup> Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Proposes Rule to Ban Noncompete Clauses, Which Hurt Workers and Harm Competition (Jan. 5, 2023), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2023/01/ftc-proposes-rule-ban-noncompete-clauses-which-hurt-workers-harm-competition>.

“fissuring” practices can enable firms to exercise power over workers unchecked by antitrust *or* labor law.<sup>29</sup>

A third pillar of our efforts to protect workers is protecting them from data abuse and exploitation. The FTC has long been on the front lines of protecting people’s privacy as *consumers* of digital services, and we want to ensure these protections apply to the workplace as well as the marketplace.<sup>30</sup>

We have seen in recent years how firms can surveil workers’ every move—be it their trips to the restroom, their precise keyboard strokes, or their participation in efforts to organize their workplace. These invasive tactics can amount to basic invasions of people’s privacy and chill people’s ability to exercise basic liberties.<sup>31</sup> That’s why, in 2022, the FTC issued an advance notice of proposed rulemaking on commercial surveillance and data security practices. Our proposal explores provisions to protect against surveillance in the workplace, which exploded during the pandemic as companies sought to closely track worker productivity.<sup>32</sup>

As research has recently captured, firms can also use this surveillance data to engage in personalized wage discrimination and impose a “gamification” of wages that could have sweeping implications across the economy.<sup>33</sup> At the FTC we are intent on scrutinizing these developments and assessing whether they could constitute unfair or deceptive practices in violation of the FTC Act.

As AI models and algorithmic decision-making incentivizes firms to collect all the data they can get, the FTC is making clear that some data is simply off the table for model-training. The major strides we have recently made to safeguard Americans’ sensitive health, geolocation, and browsing data, for instance, also critically apply to workers.

Similarly, establishing protections on the terms on which firms can and cannot scrape data to train AI models will be essential. At a public workshop the FTC recently held on generative AI and the creative economy, screenwriters, voice actors, authors, and others expressed deep concern about how it felt like their life’s work had been appropriated and devalued by AI—essentially overnight.

That is why protecting fair competition is an essential part of making sure that the bargain for America’s workers remains intact. That regardless of who their employer is, or how

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<sup>29</sup> See, e.g., Marshall Steinbaum, *Antitrust, The Gig Economy, and Labor Market Power*, 82 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 45-64 (2019).

<sup>30</sup> Remarks of Benjamin Wiseman at the Harvard Journal of Law & Technology on Worker Surveillance and AI (Feb. 8, 2024), available at [https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc\\_gov/pdf/Jolt-2-8-24-final.pdf](https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/ftc_gov/pdf/Jolt-2-8-24-final.pdf).

<sup>31</sup> Memorandum of Understanding Between the Fed. Trade Comm’n (FTC) and the Nat’l Lab. Rel. Bd. (NLRB) Regarding Info. Sharing, Cross-Agency Training, and Outreach in Areas of Common Reg. Interest (July 2022), available at <https://www.ftc.gov/legal-library/browse/cooperation-agreements/memorandum-understanding>.

<sup>32</sup> Press Release, Fed. Trade Comm’n, FTC Explores Rules Cracking Down on Commercial Surveillance and Lax Data Security Practices (Aug. 11, 2022), <https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2022/08/ftc-explores-rules-cracking-down-commercial-surveillance-lax-data-security-practices>.

<sup>33</sup> Veena Dubal, *On Algorithmic Wage Discrimination*, 123 COLUM. L. REV. 1929 (2023).



the law classifies them, they maintain the freedom to bargain, to take their labor elsewhere, and to earn a fair share of the tremendous value they create.

As the FTC carries out its mandate, at every step of the way, we will continue to rely on workers and worker organizations as vital stakeholders in our efforts.

At a fundamental level, these issues boil down to the need for basic freedoms in and out of the workplace, freedoms that the FTC's mandate helps to secure. Freedom to leave one's job. Freedom to seek a better wage. Freedom to start your own business. And freedom to have a fulsome life outside of one's employment.

I'll end with an observation that, Professor Block, you made recently about NLRB General Counsel Jennifer Abruzzo, whose commitment to upholding the rule of law on behalf of working people, and in the face of incredible corporate pushback, is second to none. You said that "seeing somebody stand up and say that the federal government is on your side when you want to stand up for yourself, that you're not doing it alone, is just incredibly important."<sup>34</sup>

My hope is that working people in this country—the thousands of people who have commented in our dockets, raised their voices in our open commission meetings, and showed up to town halls—know that this agency has a duty to safeguard their livelihoods from monopoly power. It's one I am striving to uphold. And it's one that I ask all of you to continue to hold the agency accountable for delivering on for many years to come.

Thanks so much and I look forward to your questions.

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<sup>34</sup> Bryce Covert, *Meet the Activist Championing the Rights of Workers From the Inside*, THE NATION (Feb. 13, 2023), <https://www.thenation.com/article/society/jennifer-abruzzo-national-labor-relations-board/>.