FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION MOBILE DEVICE TRACKING SPRING PRIVACY SERIES FEBRUARY 19, 2014 Federal Trade Commission 601 New Jersey Avenue, N.W., Conference Center Washington, DC Reported By: Stephanie Gilley

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1	WELCOME
2	MS. KOULOUSIAS: Thank you all for coming
3	today and welcome to our seminar today on mobile device
4	tracking, which is the first in our series of spring
5	privacy series seminars.
6	My name is Amanda Koulousias and I am an
7	attorney here at the FTC in the Division of Privacy and
8	Identity Protection.
9	We are going to get started with our first
10	presentation in a few minutes, but first I just need to
11	go over some housekeeping issues.
12	Anyone who goes outside of the building
13	without an FTC badge will be required to go through the
14	magnetometer and x-ray machine prior to reentry into
15	the conference center.
16	In the event of a fire or evacuation of the
17	building, please leave the building in an orderly
18	fashion. Once outside the building, you will need to
19	orient yourself to New Jersey Avenue. Across from the
20	FTC is the Georgetown Law Center. Look to the right
21	front sidewalk and that will be our rallying point.
22	Everyone will rally by floors and you'll need to
23	check-in with the person accounting for everyone in the
24	conference center, which will likely be me or Kristen,
25	so you could look for us.

1 In the event that it is safer to remain 2 inside the building, you'll be told where to go. And 3 if you spot any suspicious activity, please alert 4 security.

5 This event may be photographed, videotaped, 6 webcast or otherwise recorded. By participating in 7 this event, you are agreeing that your image and 8 anything that you say or submit may be posted 9 indefinitely at FTC.gov or one of the Commission's 10 publicly-available social media sites.

For anybody who wants to submit questions today, we will be taking question cards, which are available in the hallway, immediately outside of the conference room if you haven't gotten one yet. And if you have a question, just fill out your card, raise your hand, and someone will come and get it from you.

For those of you who are participating via the webcast, you can email your question to mobiledevicetracking@FTC.gov, you can Tweet it with the #FTCMOBILE or you can post it to the FTCs Facebook page on the workshop status thread. Please understand that we may not be able to get to all questions, but we will do our best to incorporate as many as we can.

Now, we're going to get started today, first with a presentation by Ashkan Soltani, who is going to

give us a technical overview. Ashkan is an independent researcher and consultant who focuses on privacy, security, and behavioral economics. His research has examined the prevalence of online tracking and exposed practices designed to circumvent consumer privacy choices. And he has previously served as staff technologist in the Division of Privacy and Identity Protection here at the FTC and also worked as the primary technical consultant on the Wall Street Journal's, What They Know investigative series. Please welcome Ashkan.

TECHNICAL OVERVIEW

2 MR. SOLTANI: Good morning everyone. I am 3 glad you all made it on this rainy day. I am going to 4 just quickly go over how some of this technology works 5 and then let people jump on the panel on some of the 6 specifics. It's going to be a very kind of high-level 7 overview, but feel free to ask any questions and 8 clarifications.

1

9 So the panel is on mobile device tracking. I 10 am going to speak about location-aware devices, and 11 then I'm going to speak about device-aware locations, 12 and then kind of touch on some of the benefits and some 13 of the concerns from a technical perspective.

So we are talking about mobile phones, generally, smart phones more than kind of traditional phones, although traditional phones, feature phones, still kind of fall into the space. And we are kind of all probably aware of location-aware devices, so most of our smartphones allow us to find where -- you know map our location or find out restaurants.

The device itself collects its location from a variety of sources, so via GPS antenna that is on the device that kind of positions itself on the globe based on satellites in the sky, via local wi-fi signals that allow it to triangulate and query against databases like Google and Apple, to tell it where it is approximately located, and via the cell towers, the mobile providers like AT&T and Verizon, allow the devices to triangulate their location and then view queries like what are the, you know, restaurants in my area.

7 This is kind of a quick overview that I 8 provided to, I think, a Senate panel about two years 9 ago, but it kind of generally describes all the way the 10 device collects location and puts it onto the device.

11 We've done, with the What They Know series 12 and the FTC has also done a lot of reviews on what apps 13 collect and what apps collect location. This might 14 become kind of old news to you, but often times an app 15 will collect location to tell you where a restaurant 16 is, but then it might share it with third-party ad 17 networks or share it with other entities, to either 18 benefit the user or to kind of provide advertising.

And location generally, when you say location, it can mean a number of things. GPS location can be accurate, you know, down to 100 feet or even -depending on the technology used. Wi-fi is often accurate to a city block level, but generally -- and I think the FTC has some nice definitions of what location is in their COPPA -- I think the COPPA

1 guidelines describe location down to a city
2 intersection. Generally, we mean where you are
3 relative to kind of a map.

4 And one technology that I didn't talk about 5 in the earlier slide at the Senate hearing is kind of a 6 newer technology called Bluetooth Low Energy, which 7 isn't very flashy, so iBeacons, that's what Apple 8 refers to it and other people refer to it. And this is 9 essentially another way for a device to determine its location based on low-energy Bluetooth signals from 10 11 beacons that stores or you yourself could purchase and 12 put, so you could buy a beacon at your home and, when 13 your device encounters that beacon, you could set it to 14 do something.

15 One of the common uses here is often times 16 stores are starting to roll out beacons that would 17 allow you to, when you pass an item on a display, give 18 you an alert when you pass by that system to say, like, 19 hey, this item is on sale or here's a coupon. The 20 technology works essentially by the Bluetooth antennae 21 in your device monitoring what other Bluetooth devices 22 are around it and then, once that's detected, it will 23 signal a particular message or a particular website or a particular action on your phone. And they're often 24 very accurate down to, you know, five meters or less, 25

it depends on the specific device. And they're
 often -- they're starting to be rolled out in stores.

3 The other thing that is starting to be more 4 commonly rolled out in stores, or a class of store, is 5 device-aware stores or device-aware locations. This is 6 an example from a Cisco interface about a particular 7 interface for a mall to allow the mall to identify 8 where users are traveling, what stores they are 9 traveling to, and what displays they are looking at. 10 So this would be an example of a device-aware location. 11 In fact, Sweet Green here, many in the U.S. go to Sweet 12 Green for salads, Sweet Green is a device-aware 13 location. It, I think, partners with Nomi to identify 14 what devices come to the store, how long they stand in 15 front of the register, kind of what devices might be 16 repeat customers, for example. So if you've gone to 17 one Sweet Green and then later come back to another 18 Sweet Green.

As I said, when the device -- when your smartphone kind of tries to determine its location, it's actually a two-way signal, right? So often Bluetooth and cell tower location services are two-way, both the device is receiving as well as the device transmitting. And by transmitting, the signals that the receiver receives essentially allow them to 1 triangulate the location of the device.

2	Another way to look at your device is
3	actually a series of transmitting antennas, right? So
4	a typical smartphone will have Bluetooth antenna, a
5	wi-fi antenna, a GPS antenna which is for receiving
6	typically, and then a GSM antenna, the antenna that you
7	use to speak to AT&T or T-Mobile or whoever your
8	provider. And each of those antennas emit signals and,
9	in those signals, the provider, for example, is able to
10	triangulate the location of the device.
11	So here, Verizon and AT&T, based on its
12	network of cell towers, can tell either which cell
13	tower you are closest to, or triangulate a more
14	accurate position based on kind of the distance between
15	towers. And this is based just by your phone being on
16	and sending beacons to the network saying, hey, I need
17	a cell phone signal or what signal is near me or when
18	you use the phone. So this can happen just by the
19	device being on.

20 Similarly, there are companies like Path 21 Intelligence that intercept those same signals, that 22 Verizon or AT&T receives, to also perform triangulation 23 of your device. So this is -- the antenna in the top 24 right corner is a device that Path Intelligence sells 25 that malls and other stores can place in their mall.

And essentially, as your phone is beaconing to AT&T or 1 2 T-Mobile or whoever, these devices also pick up the 3 phone's identifier and its location, or approximate 4 location, in the mall. 5 Bluetooth happens the same way. So as your 6 device tries to look for a Bluetooth signal or is 7 communicating to a Bluetooth or wi-fi signal, wi-fi 8 networks, the device is transmitting basically a beacon 9 or a frame, looking and essentially trying to identify 10 nearby networks. 11 There are companies, I think some here today, 12 that also intercept those beacons, those signals, and 13 provide geolocation services based on your wi-fi, kind 14 of wi-fi emanations. And something -- this can happen 15 either when the device is on a network, it can happen 16 by the network you're on, so if you go to a hotspot, 17 often times the hotspot might have this feature built 18 in, or this can happen independent. So you can go to 19 Starbucks and Starbucks might have a Starbucks wi-fi 20 network, but they might also feature one of these devices to also triangulate your device based on your 21 communications to the Starbucks network. 22 23 There are variety of methods, I kind of just

23 There are variety of methods, 1 kind of just
 24 touched on a couple. Your phone might have other
 25 antennas like NFC or RFID. There's -- this is a kind

of a schema from an Opus Research paper about magnetic
 and LED lighting-based location detection, so
 emanations from your phone's LEDs or kind of magnetic
 field that it emits.

5 I'll say that the more kind of developed ones that I know about are the cell-tower-based and 6 7 wi-fi-based location technologies, as well as the 8 Bluetooth iBeacon-type technologies. And the way these 9 things -- so the question is, how do you identify the 10 user and what is identification in this? Are they 11 tracking you by name? How do they identify the same 12 device to where it comes back to the store?

13 And the key to remember is, each of these 14 antennas that we talked about on the device, the wi-fi 15 antenna, the GSM antenna, the Bluetooth antenna, they 16 all have a unique serial number, a globally unique 17 identification. This is kind of like your Social 18 Security Number, but it's specific to the chip set on 19 your phone, right? So it is designed to be globally 20 unique such that no other person or no other device has 21 that same number. And it allows them to uniquely 22 identify that device.

23 So it might not refer to the device by name, 24 but it will say, for example, you can ascertain whether 25 it's an iDevice, an iPhone device, an Apple device, or

an Android device from this information, as well as
 whether it was the same device that you saw yesterday.

3 And essentially this device, while it doesn't 4 reveal perhaps the owner's information directly, it 5 kind of helps to indicate what the location habits of a 6 particular device are. So you can say, this device 7 travels through these set of cell towers at a given 8 time or this device has come to Sweet Green before 9 yesterday or went to a different Sweet Green store last 10 week. And it allows essentially to refer to the device 11 uniquely.

12 One thing to remember is those serial numbers 13 are persistent to the device, they are hardware serial 14 numbers. There is actually very little users can do to 15 delete or change them. In fact, there was a bill last 16 week, I think Schumer was trying to propose, to make it 17 illegal to change some of these, such that when phones are stolen, they could be blacklisted based on this 18 19 information.

20 So as long as you have the device, this 21 information is persistent to the device. So it's a 22 pretty reliable or robust identifier.

And sometimes -- often times you might hear of the device identifier as being hashed. Hashing is just a kind of mathematical algorithm you can apply to

a particular identifier. So that top line, the one
 beginning with B8, that's my particular MAC address for
 one of my devices. And the bottom -- the number
 starting with 48 is the hashed version of that
 identifier.

And the key with hashing is that it kind of obfuscates the numbers, so it's very hard to go back from has number to the MAC address, the original Mac address, but you're guaranteed to always get the same outcome. So any time you see my device and you hash it with the same algorithm, in this case, this is a SHA-256 hash, you would get the same outcome.

And so what's key here is, again, the hash identifier, while it's not revealing the actual identifier, it is still another robust, unique or globally unique identifier. It is just as robust as the wi-fi address.

Actually, there was a great blog post by Ed Felten, I think last year, about whether hashing makes data anonymous. And he goes into great detail on how this work and the fact that hashing doesn't make it anonymous, it just basically transforms it from one identifier to another, but it still a robust identifier.

25

And another way to -- there was a response,

1 for example, Euclid Analytics is one of the analytics 2 companies that do wi-fi analytics. They would argue 3 that this information is anonymous, it's very difficult to identify people, right? And they said this doesn't 4 5 refer to an individual. But in response to a series of 6 letters from Senator Al Franken, they responded that, 7 yes, if you'd provided a device to law enforcement --8 or if law enforcement provided them with a device, they 9 could perhaps tell what other locations that device had 10 been.

11 So you are able to get, from a device, to a 12 historical location, even if the information is hashed. 13 So that's something to be mindful of. So it's 14 anonymous in the sense that it doesn't refer to a 15 person by name, it's hashed in that it might obfuscate 16 the original MAC address, but you can still provide 17 historic device location based on some of these 18 identifiers, even if they are hashed.

And often times these things are used for things -- you know, what are the benefits of these technologies? Well, one of the big benefits is coupons, for example. Everyone loves coupons. Or you might be able to quickly see a deal that's happening near you or maybe find the location of your seat. There is actually a great number of use cases where 1 this is helpful, both from the consumer side as well as 2 the retail side.

3 The retailers can, for example, use the 4 technology to identify what stores are popular, what 5 displays are popular, where users are going, whether 6 there is repeat customers. They can kind of use the 7 information to determine how queues are progressing, 8 whether people stand in line too long and, if after 9 five minutes you jump out of line, you might want to 10 add another queue.

11 But there is also a number of concerns with 12 this technology, which I'm sure the panel will get 13 into, but just to touch on them briefly, this 14 information can be kind of sensitive, in the sense that 15 it can provide demographic information about people's 16 age. There's no way, for example, to tell whether it's 17 a kids device you're tracking or an adult's device 18 you're tracking.

Data based on the types of other locations you've been going to, you might be able to infer demographic information like lifestyle interests. This is a company, Turnstyle, that provides demographic interests, in the bottom right, about, you know, nightclubs and music and particular interests. So you can infer, just like behavioral advertising, you can infer kind of interests based on people's location
 behaviors as well.

3 The other kind of -- this is Verizon's 4 analytics. So Verizon, as a carrier, they provide 5 their -- I think it's called Precision Insights. And 6 this is, for example, a tale of people's activities in 7 one city, in aggregate. But you know, how people spend their day, whether they go to -- have hotdogs in the 8 9 morning or whether they go to -- the top five 10 restaurants they go to. And this is essentially 11 aggregated analytics, but it provides kind of a big 12 picture people's day, right? 13 So they can track, for example, T-Mobile and 14 Verizon know how you spent your entire day, in terms of 15 the location data. And so that might be a concern to 16 some people. 17 And the general, kind of classic concerns are 18 that, like most other tracking debates, it's 19 essentially that the collection is invisible and 20 passive. People need to opt-out versus opt in, how difficult it is to opt-out. So -- group has provided 21 22 an opt-out system that lets you, for example, provide 23 your MAC address to this network to create kind of a 24 blacklist for people who want to not be tracked. That's difficult for most users, I suspect, to go and 25

1 find their MAC address. There's probably going to be 2 iterations on this.

3 One idea I had was, for example, to set up an 4 opt-out wi-fi network at each location, such that a 5 user can just join that network for a brief instance 6 and that network can capture the wi-fi address, kind of 7 like what Latanya was doing outside. So you briefly 8 join an opt-out network, it catches your MAC address, 9 adds you to the opt-out list, and kicks you off of the 10 network. That could be done in a few minutes by either 11 Seth or myself using some open source software, and 12 that would be maybe an easier way, but it is still a 13 difficult process. Users have to know that it is 14 happening. It's the typical kind of tracking debate. 15 We touched on how the identifiers might not 16 be, you know, fully anonymous or they are 17 pseudo-anonymous. And then one of the big issues, I think, is that the retention period of even the 18 19 pseudo-anonymous copy of information is unclear, so 20 whether law enforcement or other, you know, divorce 21 attorneys or whoever can get this information might be 22 of concern.

23 Convergence, finally, is one of the areas
24 that are kind of potentially sensitive. This is
25 Turnstyle -- sorry, this is Retail-Next and they, for

example, collect or combine your location history,
 wi-fi activity, point-of-sale activity, payment cards,
 et cetera to provide a kind of more complete picture of
 the user and the user experience.

5 And so as you combine things like location 6 with other types of activity like tracking or things 7 where you might -- sorry, like purchases, where you 8 might identify yourself or use a credit card or sign up 9 for a mailing list, I think people will find that the 10 location information, combined with information about 11 them, might also be sensitive.

12 This is just an example I just ran, I think, 13 the other night where CVS provides a mobile app to let 14 you, like, you know, find coupons and kind of find your 15 store, but it transmits your hashed identifier. That's 16 my hashed identifier we saw earlier in that SHA-256 17 algorithm. The app itself sends home or phones home 18 your MAC address to CVS. And Apple is trying to curb 19 this behavior, but on the Android platform, this still 20 happens.

And so this information about my usage of the app, my signing into the app, can be combined with some of the their analytics, like the retail location tracking, to get a better picture of who I am and what stores I go to.

1 So that's the general kind of landscape of 2 how this stuff works. I'd be happy to take some 3 questions.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Yeah, if anyone in the audience has any questions, feel free to fill out your question cards and somebody will come and get that for you and we can ask those.

Just to get started, Ashkan, I had a quick
question on -- so you talked about the different ways
that companies can do some of this and you talked about
both the wi-fi and the GSM interception.

12

MR. SOLTANI: Mm-hmm.

13 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Can you give us a little bit 14 of insight into why a company might want to use one or 15 the other?

MR. SOLTANI: Sure. So GSM-based, cell tower-based location analytics usually can be collected by your carrier, so the AT&T and Verizons, as well as companies like Path Intelligence that have these antennas. They are essentially kind of collection devices that intercept the communication to your carrier.

This is a pretty robust way to track users because you are -- often times your phone is always connected to your provider. So unlike wi-fi, because you might not have your wi-fi antenna on or you might not be using it, whereas your GSM often sends a heartbeat every, kind of every -- it depends on the carrier, but at a pretty regular interval, pinging the tower to identify what towers are associated with you. So it's a pretty robust way to track individuals.

7 Additionally, the GSM protocol requires one 8 of the identifiers to -- there's a persistent 9 identifier, but there's a second identifier which is 10 often the one used to track individuals called the 11 TIMSI, these rotate at some interval, but my 12 understanding is that they can be kind of persistent 13 for up to 30 days, so it provides kind of a good 14 picture of a person's location habits over 30 days and 15 whether they come to the same store or not. So it's a 16 good signal, in the sense that most people don't turn 17 off their phones.

18 MS. ANDERSON: And what about Bluetooth? 19 MR. SOLTANI: So Bluetooth is a more -- it's, 20 I would argue, most people or not as many people leave their Bluetooth antennas on. I think maybe the panel 21 22 can speak to what the prevalence and penetration of 23 this stuff is. I would argue, like, in the grand scheme of antennas, you have the GSM antenna, which is 24 25 almost always on, the wi-fi antenna which, if it's on,

1 is beaconing and maybe not connected to a network, and 2 then Bluetooth often is low energy and the distance is 3 lower, but it provides some additional benefits in that 4 the resolution is much more fine grain. You can 5 actually have much more -- you can say whether I'm next to you versus the other end of the table pretty 6 7 accurately. So Bluetooth has some benefits in this 8 context.

9 MS. ANDERSON: And does it also go in that 10 order, GSM, wi-fi, and then Bluetooth, in terms of how 11 popular each of those technologies is right now?

MR. SOLTANI: I would argue, at least I know of more companies that are doing wi-fi-based partially because I think it's potentially cheaper, it's potentially more -- I think the law is also a little bit clearer on the interception of a wi-fi signal versus the interception of a GSM signal, but I think the panel can probably speak to that.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Well, it looks like we've got about a minute left, so I think we've got time for one question that we've gotten from the audience, which -- so somebody has asked, they said they assume that there are multiple hashing algorithms and to aggregate data for a phone across multiple locations, they assume all locations would need to hash the same 1 way or use the same analytic form, is that true?

2 MR. SOLTANI: That's right. So the 3 hashing -- so a hash is essentially a transform. You 4 can hash my name by adding one character at the end of 5 my name or by changing my name by one letter. And 6 everyone would have to agree on that hash for them to 7 be able to synchronize data.

8 The one thing that is missed, I think, in a 9 lot of the hashing debates is that, often times, the 10 technology is now there where we can -- while it is 11 difficult to reverse, so while it's difficult to take a 12 hashed identifier and go back to my MAC address, you 13 can essentially enumerate the list of all MAC addresses 14 and all hashes under a set of hashes, and this is 15 called like a rainbow table, and this is -- you know, 16 I'm sure people have been following the recent Target 17 breaches and all of the other breaches, this is how hackers will determine your password. 18

19 It's very difficult to go back from a hash, 20 but you can say, you know, my name always ends up in 21 this hash, precomputed ahead of time, and then look for 22 a match.

23 So yes to the question, retailers would need 24 to be using the same hashing algorithms, coordinated 25 across different retail collection points. My

1 understanding is that the popular ones are SHA, 2 SHA-256, sum MD5 -- and so, but even if they don't, it 3 is still possible to reverse engineer to what the 4 original information was. 5 MS. KOULOUSIAS: All right. We've got we've 6 got one more question. It looks like we're running out 7 of time, so if you could answer this one --8 MR. SOLTANI: Sure. 9 MS. KOULOUSIAS: -- really quickly and then we'll get to it in more detail on the panel, I think. 10 11 But somebody has asked, can you just briefly 12 discuss security hacking concerns with wi-fi use? 13 MR. SOLTANI: Sure. So I think one of the 14 issues with wi-fi is that it's not a private 15 identifier, right? It's kind of the same issue of a 16 Social Security Number. Both my app can know my wi-fi, 17 the network around me can know my wi-fi, the ad network 18 can know my wi-fi. So as people are using wi-fi as a 19 robust identifier, it's just good to know that, for 20 example, lots of people -- you know, Latanya outside 21 knows your wi-fi identifier. And so if people are 22 making associations to that, then it is potentially 23 problematic from a privacy and security perspective. 24 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Great. Thank you very much. 25

1	PANEL DISCUSSION
2	MS. ANDERSON: We'll invite our panelists to
3	come on up.
4	We're in the process of trying to turn the
5	air down in here, so that we can be heard a little bit
6	more clearly. So I apologize if anybody couldn't hear
7	what we were saying a little earlier.
8	My name is Kristen Anderson, I am also an
9	attorney with the Division of Privacy and Identity
10	Protection. And Amanda Koulousias and I will be
11	co-moderating this panel.
12	As a reminder of how to submit questions, if
13	you're in our live audience, you can fill out a
14	question card and someone will come around and get
15	that. We may be taking them throughout, but we will
16	definitely take them at the end.
17	And if you are watching via webcast, you can
18	submit your question via email to
19	mobiledevicetracking@FTC.gov. You can Tweet it to
20	#FTCMOBILE or post it to the FTC's Facebook page in the
21	workshop status thread.
22	So now we'll begin our panel. When we put
23	together panels like these, we try to include as many
24	different perspectives as possible so that we can
25	evaluate these emerging technologies from different

1 angles.

2 Today we are joined by, starting at my left, 3 Ilana Westerman. She's a CEO and cofounder of Create 4 with Context, a digital innovation firm focused on 5 strategic research and design. She's responsible for 6 corporate development, as well as hands-on client work, 7 including research, innovation, and design. 8 Next, we have James Riesenbach, who has built 9 and led wide-ranging digital media, marketing, and analytics businesses for over 25 years. He's been the 10 11 CEO at iInside since January of 2013, after previously 12 serving as strategic advisor to the firm. 13 Next, we have Seth Schoen, who is a senior 14 staff technologist at the Electronic Frontier 15 Foundation, where he has worked since 2001, promoting 16 understanding of the implications of technology for 17 individual rights. Next, we have Mallory Duncan, who has served 18 19 as senior vice president and general counsel for the 20 National Retail Federation for more than 15 years. He's responsible for coordinating strategic, 21 22 legislative, and regulatory initiatives involving 23 customer data privacy, financial services, and consumer 24 protection. 25 And finally, we have Glenn Tinley, who

1 founded Mexia, with a focused vision to help companies 2 understand how the changing dynamics of an increasingly 3 online world impact consumer behaviors at brick-and-mortar locations and how consumer experiences 4 5 can be improved by understanding these behaviors. 6 Before we get started, I will have Seth just 7 very briefly provide an overview of what the Electronic Frontier Foundation is and what its interest is in 8 9 mobile device tracking.

10 MR. SCHOEN: Thanks. The Electronic Frontier 11 Foundation is a nonprofit advocacy organization based 12 in San Francisco. We actually have one lawyer who 13 works here in D.C., but dozens of people out in San 14 Francisco.

15 We are interested in the implications of 16 technology for individual rights, including privacy. 17 And we tend to think of location as one of the most 18 sensitive forms of personal information because of the 19 way that it implicates all of the other kinds of 20 personal information. And I can talk more about that, but it's sort of the meta of personal information 21 22 because you can use it to deduce some many other kinds 23 of things. So we are interested in the implications of location tracking for personal privacy in that respect. 24 25 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Thanks, Seth. Ilana, if you

could just briefly introduce yourself and Create with
 Context.

MS. WESTERMAN: Sure. Ilana Westerman, Create with Context, we are an experienced design firm, so what we do is we design user experiences for digital devices. So anything from mobile to web to wearables, anything that has a digital interface.

8 And what we really do is try to understand 9 the consumer first. What do they care about, what are 10 they doing, what do they need, what do they want. And 11 based on that, that's how we do our design. So it's a 12 data-driven design process.

MS. ANDERSON: Thank you. And to get us started, we'll just have Glenn from Mexia and Jim from iInside, if you can just each take a few minutes to describe the services and technologies that your companies offer and the kinds of insights they are providing to retailers and your customers.

MR. RIESENBACH: Sure. Well, good morning and it's a pleasure to be here. iInside is a technology company that's been in the business of creating location-based services for many years now, but our focus has moved, over the recent years, to creating technologies that help our clients, which are primarily retailers, better understand how to improve the customer service and customer experience and their operations and also, at the end of the day, help them compete more effectively against the growth of e-commerce companies that have compromised and made it a little bit more difficult to compete in today's retail brick-and-mortar environment.

7 So we provide a variety of tools. Everything 8 we do is aggregated. We view ourselves as part of a 9 continuum of marketing research companies that have 10 been out there for many, many years, providing insights 11 based on statistical samples of data. We are not in 12 the business of looking at individual consumers or 13 trying to provide individual insights. We are in the 14 business of providing aggregated views that help our 15 clients compete more effectively.

MR. TINLEY: And Mexia Interactive is somewhat similar to iInside. We are a location analytics firm, so we capture data for our clients based, again, on aggregate collection of that data, that helps our clients understand what is happening within their locations.

Our core belief is that we want to give them the advantage and help them understand those behaviors so that they have the added benefit of understanding what is happening online and being able to compare it 1 on location, or within those locations.

2	Our clients primarily are airports, shopping
3	centers, and large retailers, who all are trying to
4	understand what they can do better to help the consumer
5	experience and make that more effective, more efficient
6	for consumers when they are in the location. And we
7	work specifically with clients on a one-to-one basis to
8	analyze that behavior and anonymize it in varied,
9	multiple different fashions so that there is no
10	combining or profiling to be happening within any of
11	the deliverables that are provided.
12	MS. ANDERSON: Could each of you talk a
13	little bit about what exact technology you're using to
14	provide those services?
15	MR. RIESENBACH: Sure. What we do is we will
16	work both with the retailer's existing technology, if
17	they have wi-fi access points that are used for public
18	wi-fi, to allow them to provide wi-fi to consumers,
19	that those sources of hardware can also cull the data
20	and help us aggregate it.
21	And we also have our own hardware that we
22	will place throughout the store that utilizes a
23	combination of Bluetooth and wi-fi to sample the
24	shopper audience or in airports or other environments.
25	MR. TINLEY: And again, we're very similar.

1 We capture either a Bluetooth -- what's called 2 Bluetooth Classic or Bluetooth Low Energy, as well as a 3 wi-fi signal. We are a little bit different in that we 4 only assemble and install our own hardware in 5 facilities, so we are not dependent on pre-existing 6 installations of anything to use and capture the data. 7 We are installing our own hardware in spaces, based on 8 deliverables of what the client is trying to achieve 9 and depending upon the granularity that they're trying 10 to achieve. 11 MS. ANDERSON: And are each of you also 12 combining all of the data that comes from the wi-fi and 13 the Bluetooth? 14 MR. RIESENBACH: Yes, we combine it. And 15 what we try to do is de-duplicate, so if we are seeing 16 the same behaviors in multiple cases, we try to look 17 just in aggregate. So we want to make sure that we're 18 providing the most valid, statistically reliable 19 samples that we can to our clients. MR. TINLEY: And I'll answer that a little 20 bit differently. By combining, if you mean combining 21 22 within an individual client, we will make sure that one 23 device either has both, if we capture both signals, 24 it's one device. But no data is ever combined with

25 other clients, so I just wanted to be clear about that.

We're not combining data amongst clients. It's always
 within an existing client.

3 MR. RIESENBACH: And that applies to us as 4 well.

MS. ANDERSON: Great, thanks.

5

6 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Great. So Mallory, if you 7 could just give us a little bit of insight into what 8 retailers are looking to gain from these technologies? 9 Are there particular insights that you know are 10 particularly important to NRF members? And just some 11 of their thoughts on this.

MR. DUNCAN: Sure, I'd be happy to. Let me just start by saying NRF represents the broad range of the retail industry, from single store operators to some of the largest retailers in the U.S.

And retailers obviously want to be successful, but to be successful they've got to do two things. First of all, they have to understand their customers and secondly is they have to understand their stores. Now that may sound very obvious, but in fact it's very, very difficult to do in each case.

The first drive for retailers is try to find how do we deliver the services and the attention that our customers want so they will be encouraged to come back to that particular store. 1 The second one, which is understanding the 2 store, is how is your store laid out? How are things 3 arranged in that store in such a way that people are attracted to it? How do people move through the store? 4 5 And that could be factored by your product selection, 6 it's location within the store, and necessarily, what 7 are the avenues for loss. And so loss prevention is a 8 big part of it.

9 We use these tools in order to increase our 10 understanding of the stores and their operation. And 11 when you do that, you're striking a balance. You're 12 maximizing the store's effectiveness, which increases 13 your ability to compete with others, and at the same 14 time, you can't go so far in doing it that you destroy 15 the trust that's inherent in the first thing, which is 16 to bring people in so they want to shop in your store. 17 So we are using these tools to try to find

18 the best possible balance between those two.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Great. And so, you know, Jim and Glenn, you both mentioned the variety of kind of insights that you can offer to retailers or other customers. I'm wondering if you can give us a little bit more detail about some of the particular insights that you offer? For example, you know, are you looking at new versus returning customers, are you able to tell 1 who has actually entered as opposed to possibly walked 2 by a location?

3 MR. RIESENBACH: Yeah. There's a range of 4 data that we're able to collect via our methodologies. 5 The first is pathing. So we are able to look, in 6 aggregate, at how shoppers move throughout the store. 7 The retailers are using this in many ways to optimize 8 their store environments.

9 We have many retailers -- one of the most expensive aspects of running a retail business is real 10 11 estate. And they want to understand, where do shoppers 12 go and how are they optimizing that environment, both 13 from a merchandising and marketing perspective, but 14 also from a flow for customers, so that customers are 15 able to easily find what they're looking for. So 16 pathing is very important.

17 The second one is dwell time. So we are able 18 to look at, again in aggregate, how many shoppers go into a particular department and what's the average 19 20 time they spend in that department. Now, that helps 21 them to understand -- the retailer to understand are 22 they providing the right level of customer service, do 23 they have the right staffing at a particular time, are 24 they providing the right products and the right mix of products side-by-side? 25

1 The third, and this is very important, and 2 this is both in retail and in other environments, is 3 wait time. Our clients are very focused on providing 4 the best throughput, if you will, at the cash 5 registers. And to basically assure that customers 6 don't wait in line.

7 One of our clients has a benchmark that they 8 set that says two minutes is the maximum time that they 9 want any customer to wait at a cash register. And so 10 what we do is we help them say, over the course of a 11 week, by day of week and time of day, these are the 12 areas where you are meeting your benchmarks and this is 13 where you're not and here's how you have to reconsider. 14 Do you open more lanes, do you staff differently? So 15 that's important.

16 And the final one that we are able to do is 17 because of the way that we hash, and Ashkan talked 18 about this, we can see the same device multiple times, 19 but again that is done in a way that will show a retailer, first of all, how many -- what percentage of 20 21 shoppers came back to their store on a recurring basis. 22 Many grocers and convenience stores are really 23 interested in that because they want to understand how 24 are they doing in customer loyalty and repeat visitation and also even across the single chain. 25

Now, we don't share across different
 companies, but within the same chain, a convenience
 store company, for instance, may want to know are their
 customers going to multiple stores within the same
 chain.

6 So those are the basics of what we do.7 Glenn, I'm sure you have some others as well.

8 MR. TINLEY: Well, just touching a little bit 9 on what Mallory had said is, retailers and malls, which 10 are a collection of retailers, are interested in --11 they have departments that are set up to help them 12 determine what products they are going to go across a 13 chain of stores or a grouping of stores.

So they are interested in knowing, are groups of -- are our customer base spending time in certain aisles or around certain products where, in one area of the country, where they may not be in a different area of the country. And that helps them to determine maybe is their product selection different, or should it be different, or should their product mix be different.

And by measuring whether or not, or collecting the data of whether or not they're dwelling in specific aisles or by specific displays, and are customers then actually stopping at checkout, because that helps them to measure conversion of, are people
actually coming into the store and leaving without
 checking out.

3 So product selection and where aisles are 4 placed and how aisles are placed in stores are crucial 5 understanding points for retailers.

6 In a shopping mall environment, the 7 collection of retailers is very important. So how is our store mix set up? So we work with some mall 8 9 clients who introduced a new store into one mall and 10 they want to understand, are those customers that are 11 going to the new store there, are they also going to 12 other stores, are they spending time in other stores, 13 or are they not visiting the new store? And if they're 14 getting a positive amount of information from that, 15 then they can look to expand the store maybe across 16 some of their other locations, some of their other mall 17 locations.

These are things that -- these are decisions that affect millions of dollars, in terms of real estate, in terms of leasing, product selection, product mix, and these are the decisions that this data is helping companies to make. All, again, in aggregate. But one of the other things is in relation to

24 staffing. We recently worked with a company, a mall 25 company, who we determined that they had security staff

coming in at a specific time of day on a consistent
 basis across a network.

3 And what we provided them with was, you know, 4 your traffic and what you think is happening, or what 5 you traditionally think is happening in that center, 6 has shifted by about an hour-and-a-half. So they 7 readjusted some of their staffing schedules of their 8 security because they wanted to staff up more when they 9 are required and they don't need as many on-hand when 10 there are less people. It's all based on ratio. 11 And that is allowing them, not currently 12 right now, but as they roll this out, they estimated 13 that this is about a quarter-million dollar savings to 14 their bottom line. So they are helping their bottom 15 line, but they're also making sure that their customers 16 are getting the attention, in terms of having staff on 17 when the ratios are requiring it.

18 So the customer experience is not necessarily 19 impacted immediately there, but it is, because if 20 something were to occur, they know that they have got 21 appropriate security staff on hand.

22 So those are just different ways that taking 23 the information, and it's general information based on 24 patterns and movements and behavior, that is allowing 25 them to then analyze that and make these decisions.

1 MS. ANDERSON: Okay. I have a bit of a 2 technical question. So with respect to the wi-fi and 3 Bluetooth, are you -- whether it's tracking within a 4 mall, can you set it up so that you're only tracking 5 within common areas of the malls and not spilling over 6 into the stores? Or for individual retailers, can you 7 ensure that the tracking is taking place just within 8 the walls of the stores or does it spill out a little 9 bit into the hallway? And how do you account for those 10 things? 11 MR. RIESENBACH: We are able to attenuate the 12 devices so that we can basically either narrow or 13 increase the range, depending on the goals and 14 objectives. So we can actually, each individual piece 15 of hardware, can have a range that we determine that 16 says, we only want to track within this store or even 17 within this department or even down to within this 18 particular lane for cash registers. 19 So we have a variety of technologies that 20 allow us to geo-fence and block off other areas we 21 don't want to see. MR. TINLEY: Very similarly, in a mall 22 23 environment or a large environment like that, naturally a signal is still a signal, so there is a certain 24 amount of movement, but based on what the deliverable 25

1 is, in terms of maintaining signals within a common 2 area is how things are reported

3

on.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: And so we've gotten a question, both of you mentioned that one of the insights that you are able to offer is kind of the new versus returning customer rate.

8 And so, you know, in order to determine that, 9 how long do you keep that individual information to 10 determine that?

MR. TINLEY: Well, in terms of individual 11 12 information, we don't report -- we are not reporting on 13 specific devices necessarily that are returning. 14 They're captured in an aggregate form, so it's a 15 percentage. What we report on is 12 percent of the 16 customers in this store visit three times per month, 8 percent visit four times per month. So that's what is 17 18 being reported and managed.

And the reason to do that is, (a) it is aggregate, so it is percentages or, you know, a total number of counted devices that are coming back in. So it's not this device. And some will say that, yes, you can still track it or bring out, specify, a specific device, but in the end, our clients don't have access to that individual data, they have access to aggregate

1 data. That data is automatically aggregated at the 2 time that it's collected and moved to a different set 3 of servers, so it's not able to then highlight out a 4 specific person.

5 MR. RIESENBACH: The other thing that's 6 important to recognize is that the turnover of mobile 7 devices is frequent and increasing. Therefore any 8 device that is seen is going to have a limited lifespan 9 in general, as far as the use of that data. Because 10 consumers upgrade the device and then we basically are 11 going to see a completely new device. We obviously 12 don't know who that consumer is or anything about them 13 anyway, but that is one of the self or automatically 14 refreshing aspects of the methodology.

MR. SCHOEN: So it seems like it would be useful to draw the distinction here between what you report to the retailer and what you, as the analytics provider, know.

I think the intention of the person asking the question was what do you, as the analytics provider know? What information do you have, as opposed to what information goes your retail clients.

23 MR. TINLEY: Well, I guess there's two 24 different things. Two things about -- our contracts 25 are very specifically and purposefully set out that the

1 data that is collected on an ongoing basis with our 2 clients is our client's data.

So we are legally and code of conduct obligated, and contractually obligated, that we don't go into that data to then determine -- the data belongs to our client. So we're not going back in to figure out specific -- or pull out specific devices, as well as the data is still on an aggregate server. So it's being reported that way.

But yes, as an analytics firm, I guess you could say that yes, we have access to -- we have access to the data across, but we as a company do not combine any of that data and it belongs to the individual clients.

MR. RIESENBACH: It's important to note that the only data that is stored by any of the companies that are signatories to the code of conduct are hashed MAC addresses.

Now, we understand from Ashkan's
presentation, is there a theoretical possibility that
that could be used in a way that you could see a
pattern from that same device? Sure, if there were a
massive number of implementations across the entire
universe. That's not really the state of the industry
and it won't be for a long time to come.

1 What we have is a hashed MAC address, so we 2 don't actually store anything that is identifiable, 3 even to the specific device right now. And even for 4 our own purposes, the only thing that we will do is use 5 it against the statistical modeling methodology. 6 So we never pretended or claimed to be a 7 tracking company. We are a statistical modeling and 8 marketing research company that provides profiles of 9 what happens in the store based on a relatively small 10 sample size. 11 You know with Bluetooth, and the question was 12 raised earlier, what percentage of devices are actually 13 seen when people go into a store. Well, Bluetooth is a 14 very precise methodology to see, down to a granular 15 level where consumers are, but at the same time, we're 16 seeing about 5 percent of the shoppers that walk into a 17 store. So this is a technology that is suited to very 18 high traffic environments, stores that have 1,000 or 19 2,000 shoppers a day, when you're seeing 5 percent it 20 becomes meaningful data. And so that's really the way the approach is working. 21 And so if you are seeing 5 percent, maybe you 22 23 are going to see a larger percent with wi-fi, maybe as 24 much as 25 percent, but it is still a sample and it is

25 not about trying to track or identify, it is really

about creating insights that are useful to the
 business.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Okay, thank you. So we've gotten a lot of great questions from our audience. One of them that has come in is for Mallory. Somebody has asked if you could expand upon how this technology helps with loss prevention.

MR. DUNCAN: Sure. I mean, retailers use a 8 9 lot of techniques for loss prevention. We have 10 security cameras in the stores, for example, we will 11 have anonymous security personnel in the store. It is 12 also possible that, if you see goods moving out of the 13 store in conjunction with particular, again, anonymous 14 identifiers, that shows you where there are leaks in 15 your operation and it can also potentially show you 16 where there are -- there might be groups, we have a lot 17 of problems with organized retail threats, there may be 18 groups that are moving collectively, in order to commit 19 crimes in the store.

20 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Thank you. And Jim, one of 21 these questions that has come in is actually about 22 something that you had said about the aggregate 23 information.

And so the question is, for information at the retail -- is the information aggregated at the

1 retail location or is it collected and stored

2 individually on your servers and then aggregated for 3 reporting?

4 MR. RIESENBACH: Well, okay. Let me try to 5 interpret the question.

6

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Sure.

7 MR. RIESENBACH: So I assume that's -- how do 8 we collect the data and report it. We collect 9 everything specifically within each individual 10 environment where we have presence. So for some 11 chains, where let's say we have 20 or 50 stores, each 12 individual store is collected in its own data file, so 13 to speak.

14 And then what we'll do is, it's important for 15 clients that they are able to see this data, either at 16 the store level, at the regional or divisional level, and at the corporate level. And so what we'll do is we 17 18 will, in keeping with the notion of aggregated 19 reporting, we will roll it up into the appropriate 20 level of detail that the people that are going to 21 actually use the data want to see it. And in many 22 cases, it is at a corporate level.

But it's important for us that we're providing the tools. At the end of the day, if a retailer is trying to improve the customer experience, that happens where the -- you know, where the rubber meets the road is at the store level. And the store manager really wants to be able to understand, what can they do on a day-to-day basis to staff appropriately, to market and merchandise their products appropriately, and to make sure that they have the right number of lanes and cash registers open.

8 MS. ANDERSON: Okay, thank you. At this 9 time, since we talked a little bit about the insights 10 that some of the retailers can gain and the benefit 11 that can accrue to customers, we'd like to learn a 12 little bit more about consumers' perspectives and their 13 experience as they are navigating the retail 14 environment.

15 So at this time, we'll invite Ilana Westerman 16 to give a presentation on what she's found through some 17 of her research.

18 MS. WESTERMAN: Thank you. Before I get 19 started with what customers think and want, I want to 20 just do a little bit of background.

And really what we find is, is what retailers want to do is create trust with the consumers. And consumers want to trust the retailers. But there's four things we really need to have for that to happen.

1 The first thing is is that consumers have to 2 understand, there has to be transparency. So they have 3 to be aware of what's happening. The second thing is that they have to have choice and they have to be able 4 5 to control it, if they care. They don't always care, 6 but if they care. The third is engagement. So if you 7 try to go control it, is easy to do? And lastly, that they're getting value. So if they're giving you 8 9 something, are they getting something back. 10 The other thing that I wanted to do, just 11 from a background perspective, is talk a bit about 12 design and how design differs from art. So if you're 13 an artist, what you're doing is you're creating 14 something for yourself. But if you're a designer, what 15 we try to do is we create for other people. 16 So it's really important for us to begin 17 with, before we even draw anything, is to understand the people we're designing for, who are they, what do 18 19 they care about? What's their context, what's their 20 environment, and making sure that we're designing for 21 that. So really what I want to talk about today is 22 23 that first phase of understand, and some of the 24 research we recently did. So this was a fairly large study, over 4600 25

Americans participated. We looked at retailers across
 the country, they were only large retailers, in a
 series of different techniques, both qualitative and
 quantitative.

5 And what we found overall is that Americans 6 do trust. We do trust. In general, we trust retailers 7 a little bit more than average, so that's a good spot 8 to be in.

9 The other thing that we found is we are 10 willing to give up our information. 97 percent of us 11 will give up a piece of data for a deal, so it's not 12 that we are not willing to do it.

13 So in this short little video here, Alicia is 14 going to tell us a little bit about what she thinks 15 about an article she read. So in this experiment, what 16 we did is we had people read an article about stores 17 tracking their cells and asked people just to give us 18 their reaction.

19 (Video played: "That's crazy, that they can do 20 that. Even if you don't sign into their wi-fi, that they 21 can track you. But at the end of the article they talked 22 about giving people the option to, you know, giving people 23 to get Amazon credit or Google Play credit if they give 24 their information and let people track them. Yeah, they will 25 get a lot more people to agree to that willingly than if 1 they just look at it.")

2 So again, as long as we get value, we are 3 willing to give up information. But what we find here is people are much more likely, 2.5 percent more 4 5 likely, to give up information if it makes sense to 6 them. 7 So here, we asked people about giving up their 8 location information to find something in a store, so a 9 map-type app. And it made sense to people why their 10 location was needed, so 75 percent said they would give that 11 information. 12 30 percent still would give information when 13 it didn't make sense, to the books and magazines that 14 they read, but still just to have an application, like 15 a map application, they would still give up that 16 information. 17 The third thing we found, which is really important, is all data is different. Some data means 18 19 more things to people than others. And the first thing 20 is, things that you would think, like your name, your phone number, your address, those are the things to the 21 22 far right, those directory information, that people 23 care the least about. They are very willing to give 24 that information up.

25

But what we find that people care the most

about is personal digital data. These are things on 1 2 your device such as the pictures on your phone, your 3 address book, your social network connections. Those 4 sorts of things people care the most about. And the 5 reason we find that is because people say, you know, 6 these are other people, not just myself. I can give up 7 my data, that's my choice, but I really don't have the 8 right to give up somebody else's data. So my contact 9 list has other people, photos of other people on my phone, so that's when people get really sensitive. 10 11 The other thing that is really, really 12 important, there is a big distinction with location. 13 So people are very willing to give up where there 14 location is right now, they are starting to see 15 benefits to that. It is not something that they're 16 terribly concerned about. 17 But when you ask about where they have been, 18 now people care. And that's something that they don't 19 want to give up. So there's a big distinction when it 20 comes to that type of location. 21 So now Mark also, in this experiment, read a 22 similar article and he's going to tell a little bit 23 about what he cares about and what doesn't matter as

24 25 much.

(Video playing: "I can see why they would do it,

1 just so they know what customers are looking at at the malls 2 or using their cell to gather information, but that's kind 3 of invading your privacy though. I don't mind if they're 4 tracking what I'm doing in the store, but getting the 5 information from my cell phone, that worries me. And I 6 wouldn't want them to get my contacts, my files, my apps, or 7 anything from my cell phone. My location is fine, but where 8 I'm walking through the store, and I'm -- whether their 9 cameras are tracking what I'm looking at and things like 10 that, but my personal information, that bothers me a lot, 11 because I do have private information on my cell phone.") 12 So what's really important, as designers, is

13 to understand that. Because we want to message people 14 and explain things to people and we want to know what 15 do they care most about, and messaging them about that 16 versus things that they care less about.

17 But the other thing that we found, which is really important, is that that component of trust, that 18 19 we really need before anything else, is transparency. 20 So people have to be aware that something has happened, otherwise they are not going to go try to control it. 21 22 And so we see this really low awareness 23 overall of the fact that stores are collecting 24 information. 33 percent thought that maybe that could

happen. It gets a little bit higher when you ask

25

1 someone about location.

But then when we interview people afterwards, there is a lot of confusion around this. They said, well maybe it could happen, but I'm not quite sure how it would happen. And it's not quite clear to consumers what's happening.

7 (Video playing: "So I said maybe just because you 8 know this is kind of something I'm not sure about. For 9 example, one of my coworkers was just talking about 10 something like this at our work, because we have wi-fi, and 11 so when you're at work or when you're in a store or whatever 12 your phone generally connects to the wi-fi, and you might be 13 looking at something on the Internet while you're strolling 14 through, or you might be, maybe you scroll through and look 15 at your bank account real quick or something like that, but 16 I don't know. So it's something that kind of like a question that's been brought up, so I'm not positive about, 17 18 and I'm not really that good at technical things, so I 19 wouldn't really know unless I asked somebody who was and so 20 that's why I was kind of like maybe.")

21 So from a design perspective, we really want 22 to start by creating that awareness. So what we looked 23 at is the most logical places are signage in stores or 24 on the device. And this would be an easy way to create 25 general awareness.

1 So the first thing we did is we said, okay, 2 let's look at signs. And so we had people go into 3 stores and shop for things and then we had them come 4 back and draw out what they saw in the stores. And 5 what we found is that people only recalled 8 percent of 6 the signs that they saw in the store. And so this is pretty low if you want to create general awareness. 7 8 I'm going to skip this video.

9 The other thing that we found is that 10 consumers, when you have a consumer notification such 11 as this one here that is in one of the counties where 12 we did the research, zero percent of the people 13 recalled seeing this sign, and it was in all of the 14 stores.

The next thing we want to look at is that, okay so fine, maybe they can't recall, you know, exactly what they saw, but was there any form of ambient awareness. Did they see it out of the corner of their eye? Were they aware that it was there and it didn't actually maybe register specifically what the sign was?

22 So we showed them signs that were present in 23 the stores and signs that weren't. What we found is 24 that, overall, people were more often wrong than right. 25 They thought a sign was in the store that wasn't,

1 versus a sign that actually was in the store.

2 So there's so much coming at us, there's so 3 much information across all of the store signs, that we 4 are not really paying attention in great detail. 5 (Video playing: "What I'm amazed at is how much I 6 don't notice. That's amazing. Yeah, I was surprised how 7 much I didn't notice. I mean, you go to stores all the 8 time, and I quess you don't always notice, and they're 9 spending all this money. I just thought, Oh my God, spending all this money on all these signs, and I didn't 10 11 even notice them.") 12 So why aren't people looking at signs? Well, 13 we find that some people are kind of in the mode of get 14 in and get out. They really want to get that job done, 15 efficiency mode shopping. But other times when you're 16 shopping, you're really focusing on the product and that's what it's about, or the experience of the store, 17 18 so that's where the attention goes. 19 But that doesn't mean that there weren't some 20 signs that did well. There are some signs that people did notice at 8 percent. And what we found is there is 21 22 three factors that really increased awareness. 23 The first is context, if the sign is part of the activity. So if you are trying to find socks in 24 25 the store, the sign to tell you where menswear is could

1 be helpful. Also, when it's at eye level and there's a 2 lot of repetition of the message, then people recalled 3 it. And at a glance, easy to parse. So if you look at 4 the sign over here to the right, the all body care, 5 that was a sign that was recognized by most people. 6 Compare that to the consumer notification sign with all 7 of those words, very hard to parse. So people aren't spending that time to actually engage with it. 8

9 So the next thing we wanted to look at was, 10 well, can we just message on smartphones. And there 11 was a good study that Google did recently that said 12 that 84 percent of smartphone shoppers use their phones 13 in stores.

And so what we wanted to try to find out is how often are they using the phones in stores, because that could be another easy way to potentially message them.

But unfortunately what we found is that only 19 11 percent of consumers had phones visible at any point 20 in time in the store. And so that's a pretty low 21 percentage.

We compared that to people who were in a mall area and we found that 30 percent of the people had phones visible in that area.

And then we kind of looked at, well, why is

this? Why aren't people having their phones out? 1 2 Well, one reason is that your hands are busy. And what 3 we did then is we counted people's ability to have 4 their phone out and available. And so what we saw was 5 -- we counted how many hands they had free. So when you had no ability, then obviously you couldn't hold 6 7 your phone. You might have limited ability, to have 8 one hand free, or you could have full ability with two 9 hands free.

10 So in stores, only 63 percent of people had 11 some ability compared to 80 percent in the mall.

12 So at the end of the day, if you ask us, so 13 should we not put notice on signs and devices, well, it 14 can definitely reinforce the message of what's being 15 collected, but it's not going to be a way to really 16 create wide-spread awareness. After people are aware, 17 will they see it out of the corner of their eye? Yes, if the signs are well-placed and the messaging is 18 19 well-placed and done in context, it can. But at the 20 onset, if people aren't aware, then this is not necessarily the way to create that wide-spread 21 22 awareness.

23 So the next thing is -- this is kind of like 24 a sad story, I'm telling you how everything doesn't 25 work. Now I'm going to tell you how things maybe can work. So as designers, we take that -- this is this context, we can't change this. We can't make people take their phones out if they don't want to. We can't make them pay attention to signs if they don't want to. So therefore, how can we solve this problem, given that context?

7 So there are three different ways that you 8 can really create awareness. The first way is the best 9 way, which is called implicit awareness and that is 10 when you don't need notice at all. So an example is 11 your map app. Does your map know where you are? Yeah, 12 I hope it knows where I am, I want it to know where I 13 am. I don't need notice to know that, it's implicit.

14 The second is explicit, and that's direct 15 communication. It could be an advertising campaign or 16 something like just in time notice. And you have to 17 get their attention for people to have explicit 18 awareness.

And last is that ambient awareness that we were just talking about, which is signs. And this is something that can be very helpful to reinforce what somebody already knows.

23 So just a quick hypothetical with implicit 24 awareness, and this is how -- what we really advocate 25 for as much as possible when collecting information is give

1 people value that makes sense to them why you have 2 it.

3 So an example is, let's say that you downloaded a wish list app at the holidays and all of 4 5 your friends and family joined and told you what they 6 wanted. And let's say that your mom really likes some 7 perfume. I don't know about you guys, but I have a 8 hard time buying for my mom. So she really likes a 9 certain perfume and then, when you walk into a 10 retailer, it says, oh yeah, we have that perfume. So 11 you go ahead and you buy it. 12 And then say next year, you're online, you're 13 at the same retailer's site and they say, oh, by the 14 way, if your mom liked that perfume, other people that 15 liked that perfume liked this sweater, maybe you want 16 to buy her this sweater. And people love that. Yeah, that would really make my life easier if I have that. 17 18 And all of the sudden, what do I know? I 19 believe that you know where I am, I believe that you 20 know where I am over time, I believe that you know my social network, I believe that you know who I am when I 21 22 am on my computer or another device, and I'm getting 23 value for all of that. And you haven't had to give me 24 any notice, it's just implicit in the actual 25 application. So Ellen is talking about this.

1 (Video playing: "My niece wanted the Harry Potter 2 movie, and I walked into Target, and they just didn't have 3 it, so what would have been nice is -- I didn't realize that 4 I also went to Walmart that day, but I also was in 5 Walgreens. If I was in that store, and they alerted me they 6 had that movie, I would have cut half my time, so it would 7 have been wonderful if I had a reminder.") 8 So the second thing is explicit awareness. 9 And with this, we're really at this point in time 10 where, because people aren't aware, we are going to 11 have to use techniques around explicit awareness. And 12 not everything can be implicit. There are going to be 13 certain things that are going to be collected that 14 people don't necessarily understand how it's actually 15 helping them. 16 So in these cases, the best way to do it is

17 currently in with just-in-time notice. So when you 18 need the information, asking for the information.

This crazy concept to the right, we're not advocating for it, but it's just a way, from a design perspective you could solve it, which is potentially a way to plug in your phone to get power while you're in a store with a cart and then, all of the sudden, you could see your phone. So this is the way to overcome the issue of no hands. But this would be a potential 1 way to give explicit awareness.

And ambient awareness, again, looking at the future, there is going to be -- as we see more and more wearables, the ability to do more tactile kinds of things, vibration and things like that could come. But for today, right now where we are at is more about visual signs and screens. And again, auditory might help in the future as well.

9 But this is a big design challenge. I mean, 10 what we are trying to do is make people aware of 11 something and it doesn't always make sense to them why 12 you need the information. So this isn't easy. This is 13 something that's going to take time.

And so what we've been working on first is a my data symbol. So as we do explicit campaigns, as we do more around implicit awareness, at some point we have to continue to reinforce this. And we'd like this to be something that's really universal across all data collection.

20 So the goal really here was to communicate to 21 people that information was being collected and 22 transmitted, we wanted to make sure that it was 23 flexible for all different types of screens and 24 signage, and we are just aware that we are not going to 25 get this immediate awareness.

1 So if you look at the image right there, the 2 wheelchair image, that is a great icon. It's a classic 3 icon. It tells you, without any words, what it means. That's very difficult to do, it's not something that is 4 5 common in the icon world. But when you look at the 6 recycle icon below it, that is also a very well-done 7 icon and it does explain what recycling is, but at the 8 onset it wasn't something that you could roll out 9 without words. You had to explain it at first so that people recognized and understood what it meant. 10 11 So it's a process and we have tested over 300 12 symbols to date and we're still not there. So I am 13 just going to show you, at a high level, some of the 14 things that we are looking at and kind of what feedback 15 we're getting from consumers. 16 So these are some of the different concepts 17 we are looking at. Many of these tested well, but over 18 300 different concepts we looked at to even get to the 19 point we're at right now. 20 And so what we did is we take this and we ask people, look at this and just tell us what you think it 21 22 means. And we don't tell them anything about personal 23 information or data tracking. And we're seeing overall, I've given you the list, some words actually 24 do apply and some don't. And we're starting to see 25

some traction here. We're getting up to 55 percent when it comes to sending and transmitting, but "my data" is still down at 32 percent. And having people understand that this is my data being transmitted is difficult.

6 When you compare it to locations symbols as 7 the positive control here, we are seeing over 70 8 percent, so that's really our goal. So we are going to 9 continue to -- and try to get there. But at the end of 10 the day, this is a process I think we all have to go 11 through, from a design perspective. We are not going 12 to, tomorrow, all of the sudden have people wake up and 13 be aware.

But if we can get to a point where we can actually create this implicit awareness applications, create an environment where people are getting value for giving information, and then reinforcing it in a way that they are aware it's happening and that, if they care about, they can go control it. If they don't care about it, it's not getting in the way. MS. KOULOUSIAS: Thank you, Ilana.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Thank you, Ilana.

22 MS. ANDERSON: Okay. So we've been getting 23 several questions from the audience and a lot of them 24 have been about notice and awareness.

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Ilana talked a lot about that and how

important transparency is, so we'll start off by directing a question to Mallory and just ask how you and your members have thought about providing notice and creating awareness around this type of mobile device tracking.

6 MR. DUNCAN: Sure. It's a very good question 7 and, as I said at the beginning, it's really about what 8 is necessary in order to preserve the level of trust 9 with your customer.

Let me give you one easy example that I think will make it clear. There's a lot of discussion in this field about talking about tracking. One could just as easily, in many cases, substitute the word observing and it suddenly sounds a lot less scary. And the question is, do you have to give notice for observations?

17 One example in the retail environment would 18 be the use of heat maps. Both of the gentlemen here 19 provide heat maps that show how groups of people move 20 around the store. Well, you could have a situation, 21 say, in a grocery store where, where most of us shop, we 22 go off first immediately to the produce and we end 23 up buying the frozen food at the end of the 24 transaction.

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Well, if you've got heat map observation that

1 flows in your store and you see an unusually large 2 number of people in the frozen food section, it means 3 they are probably about to check out, so the retailer 4 might take that information and say, okay, I'm going to 5 open up more lanes, get more sales associates up front, 6 so that the amount of time that it takes people to 7 check out is a lot shorter than it would be otherwise. 8 Now that's, I would argue, a benefit to 9 consumers, but it's not necessarily something that you 10 are going to provide notice about because it's almost 11 an intrinsically, good management of the store 12 operation, as I was talking about earlier. 13 Now why is that important? There's obviously 14 a big conflict going on right now, or an apparent 15 conflict, between online stores and brick-and-mortar 16 stores. One of the things customers like in the online

17 world is that they can very quickly accomplish their shopping. And many online stores have moved to 18 19 one-click shopping, one-click checkout. So in the 20 brick-and-mortar department, if we are going to compete 21 in that area, those stores would like to replicate that 22 very fast click-through checkout, which means putting 23 more sales associates on the line and getting customers 24 out of there, so that in the brick-and-mortar 25 environment you have both the personal interaction of

1 being able to get questions answered quickly and 2 combine that with the quick checkout, which lets the 3 brick-and-mortar stores compete more effectively with 4 the online store. 5 Again, all of this is part of competition and 6 all of this goes to building consumer trust. None of 7 it requires notice. 8 MR. RIESENBACH: Mallory, can I ask you a 9 follow-up on that? 10 MR. DUNCAN: Sure. 11 MR. RIESENBACH: So one of the things that 12 we've come to understand is that consumers basically 13 understand that, when they enter a retail environment, 14 you know, there's been loss prevention surveillance 15 techniques that have been used for years and we've come 16 to believe that that's a common awareness and 17 understanding among consumers when they enter most 18 retail environments that that's part of the approach 19 that retailers are taking and not to mention that, once 20 they do check out and actually buy something, all of that data is part of their record permanently as well. 21 22 So do you think that there is, already, a 23 high degree of awareness of consumers about these types 24 of things? 25 MR. DUNCAN: I can't say what the awareness

1 is to any specific element that you mentioned, and that 2 would vary from retailer-to-retailer, which makes 3 competition and what makes it possible for retailers to 4 garner trust with their particular set of customers. 5 But by and large, the fact that you are engaging in 6 observable activity in a store is something that people 7 are aware of.

8 Now in terms of the details of the 9 transaction, that will vary dramatically from one 10 retailer to the other. In some instances, it's 11 essentially an anonymous transaction, in others, if 12 you've opted into a loyalty program, it may be much 13 more detailed, so it varies tremendously.

MS. ANDERSON: So is there something unique about this type of tracking though that does require notice? And Seth, you may have something to say about this, and we'll follow up with Glenn and Jim as well.

MR. SCHOEN: I mean, I feel like hearing all of this, I have quite a different paradigm because there has been a lot of focus in this conversation on notice and not a focus on consent and not a focus on whether there is an underlying harm or problem with the possibility of tracking occurring without people asking for it.

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And so I would start much earlier in the

process and, rather than criticize people on this
panel, I would criticize the IEEE 802.11 standards
committee and say, why did you put a persistent unique
identifier into people's phones? Why didn't you
recognize people's privacy and security interest in not
having something in their pocket shouting where they
are to everyone who sets up a laptop to look at them?

8 Now, there is this conversation that we've 9 been having and I'm hearing here that, well, if a 10 retailer puts this up for a particular purpose, then 11 there is a question of how appropriate is their purpose or how invasive is that? Or statistic information is 12 13 not very invasive at all compared to profiling. But I 14 would start earlier and say, why are these devices 15 screaming an identifier to all and sundry in the RF environment and saying, "Hey, it's Ashkan's phone! 16 17 Hey, it's Ashkan's phone! Hey, it's Ashkan's phone!" 18 Why did the standards committees make these identifiers 19 unchanging and persistent? That's really where I would 20 start.

Now, you know, I think there is a lot of merit in saying, well, in the context of a particular retail use, it's not necessarily what people are expecting, it's not necessarily something that they've consented to. If you ask them in a survey, they

wouldn't necessarily know that it was happening or that it was physically possible or how it was done, but for certain categories of use, there is not necessarily a lot of harm in that instance. And there may be benefit in that instance.

6 So from the perspective of the individual 7 retailer or from the perspective of the individual 8 retail industry or from the perspective of the folks on 9 this panel who are doing these analytics for statistical purposes, they can say, well, given that 10 11 the technology is there and given that this possible 12 and given that we are trying to do this in a relatively 13 noninvasive way for relatively noninvasive purposes, 14 you shouldn't blame us.

So I'm going to provisionally grant that and say let's blame the technology industry for putting these persistent unique identifiers that can be read, without consent, by strangers, wirelessly without people's awareness in any situation for any purpose, into things that people are carrying around all day in their pockets.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Great, thank you. And so Glenn and Jim, I think one of the things that we wanted to hear a little bit about is your companies thoughts on, you know, are there ways that your companies are working to create transparency around the use of this
 information?

3 MR. TINLEY: I want to answer that, but I just want to also make a clear distinction that -- and 4 5 there's a lot of conversation and there's actually a 6 lot of market confusion. I spend a lot of my time 7 speaking with clients and potential clients about the 8 confusion that is -- there are applications that are on 9 a device that a person downloads and, as part of that, accepts certain terms and conditions that we all 10 11 understand that 99.9 percent of people are not reading. 12 But those are accepted and it's those 13 applications that are, and Ashkan's presentation 14 demonstrated, that the Pandora app is streaming 15 information about the device or the person and 16 different things on those devices to different parties. 17 And in the other presentation, one of the 18 videos was, you know, I have personal photos on my 19 phone, I don't think those should be shared. And we 20 agree 100 percent. 21 There's a difference between monitoring, 22 observing, tracking of something from an application 23 that is on a device that you are using versus a device being seen or observed as a dot. 24 25 And the analogy that I would give to our

clients is, think of it as, I have a bag of beans that 1 2 I'm going to make soup and I pour all of the beans into 3 the soup and I stir it all up. No one told me -- I put them into different bowls, but you don't know which 4 5 bean came from what and we don't really care. What we 6 care about is the fact that these beans are in here and 7 we know that there's some over here and there's some 8 over here and some never actually got out of the pot. 9 But we're not necessarily concerned about what bean is what and who we are going to associate that with. 10

We're not interested in individual consumers 11 12 and there is no technological way to take a MAC 13 address and determine -- or go into a device, there's 14 no connection ever made to a device. So in an 15 application, there's a connection made to a device and 16 that connection made to the device allows it to obtain 17 information. We don't do that in any way, shape, or form. 18

A phone calls out, a mobile device calls out and says, to Seth's point, yes, I'm here. We see a number, sort of like your vehicle identification number on a car that is unique to the car, it's unique to the device. But that's all we know, we just know that it's a car. We might know it's a Ford car and we might know that it's an iPhone, but that's it. We don't know that

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it's Ashkan's phone.

2 And so there needs to be a distinction that 3 we are not tracking or monitoring or observing any of 4 that application data. We are taking the data that is 5 completely -- almost irrelevant, because it can't be --6 there is no connection made to a device to go and 7 capture any individual information at all or see what 8 you're looking at or any payload data or anything along 9 those lines. So there needs to be that distinction in 10 that regards.

11 And then again, to Mallory's point, there is 12 a large amount of trust that retailers have with their 13 clients inherently, or their consumers, the customers 14 inherently. Retailers want to understand what's 15 happening so that they can help make the customer 16 experience better. They are not interested in any way, 17 shape, or form about upsetting the apple cart of the trust that they've spent years building with consumers 18 19 to make them loyal customers. A retailer would never 20 then take that and say, well, now let's start to try to 21 identify, without people knowing, let's try to identify 22 who these people are so that we can, you know, do 23 something that's going to degrade that level of trust 24 that we've spent years building.

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So it's not application-based and it's

completely separate of that. And it's completely not connected to it at all, there's never a connection made to a mobile device at all by anybody in the industry. And then secondly, that inherently there's that level of trust that retailers are adamant about protecting and they want to make sure that that's being protected.

7 So those are the -- there are not going to do 8 something that's going to upset that. So I hope I 9 answered the question, Kristen. I probably got off 10 track.

11 MR. RIESENBACH: So let me add to what Glenn 12 was saying. I agree with his points, but I do think 13 that there was a question about what are the companies 14 doing specifically to help with disclosure and 15 awareness. And we, as an industry, and Glenn's company 16 and my company and a dozen others, have been 17 participating in what we call a code of conduct across 18 the industry that essentially establishes guidelines. 19 And in many cases, there is aspects of this that we 20 have agreed are legally binding on the companies that 21 are involved.

But there is a set of principles that we went to develop this under, recognizing that this is an evolving marketplace and technology is evolving quickly. So we can't let good be the enemy of perfect,
or vice-versa. It's important that we know that this
 is one step in a continuously evolving process.

But what the core principles are, first of all, is that we will do everything we can to create that level of transparency and disclosure. And so what we're doing is we're asking -- every firm that participates in this code is asking the retailers to provide signage.

9 Now what are we doing? I think, to Ilana's 10 point, that awareness is relatively low of signage. 11 Well, we believe that the best thing to do is to come 12 together as an industry, and we are working with Ilana 13 in trying to create some types of visual cues that will 14 have that type of ubiquity when they are out, throughout 15 the marketplace, and over time.

16 We don't believe today a consumer is going to 17 walk into a store and know what that means, but we do 18 believe that, when that is spread across tens of 19 thousands of stores across the entire U.S., and 20 consumers see it on a daily basis, that it will become a visual cue that will tell people what's going on. 21 22 And so that's a step along the way, from a disclosure 23 standpoint.

And we are also putting it on our websites. We are asking our retail partners to put it on their

websites, what we're doing. So we are doing the best
 and the current methodologies available to us to
 disclose as an industry.

4 The second is that we are providing choice to 5 the consumer. And what's really important is that, if 6 the consumer does not want their device to be seen, 7 even though we are only aggregating and providing 8 statistical insights, that consumer has an ability, as 9 of now, to opt-out. And not only to opt-out with our company or a particular retailer, but to be able to 10 11 opt-out of having their device seen across the 12 industry.

13 And so we announced yesterday, with our 14 group, in addition to the code, that we have launched 15 an opt-out capability. And we've done this in 16 conjunction with a company called the Wireless Registry, 17 they've created the code. And essentially what we're 18 doing is allowing consumers to opt-out across the 19 industry. That will be active within 30 days, so we 20 will allow consumers to opt-out.

21 We have a variety of other aspects to the 22 code, some about hashing and preventing us from 23 basically collecting the actual MAC addresses and 24 storing them. So we all agree that we will hash. I 25 understand Ashkan's point that it's not impossible for

1 that to be used in other ways, but for all practical 2 purposes we don't believe that that is a reality 3 anytime in the foreseeable future.

4 For right now, what is important is that, 5 you know, that we move forward with that. And I think 6 that it's also important that we hold, not only 7 ourselves, but our clients accountable to the use of 8 the data, so that we have, within the code, an 9 understanding that the data will not be redistributed 10 to someone else or aggregated with other sources of 11 information that could be used to personally identify the individual. 12

13 So we are trying, as an industry, to be good 14 actors. We are disclosing this, we are doing 15 everything we can to communicate this across the 16 industry right now.

MS. WESTERMAN: And I'd just like to jump in here, because I got really concerned when you mentioned that this is a bad thing, you having your address put out there.

I think, from a consumer's perspective, there is a lot of value they can get. I mean, being able to walk into a store and have it know you and know what you like and recommend things to you, that could be a real benefit to this --

1 MR. SCHOEN: So you should install an app for 2 that store and say, when I got to this store, I want 3 you to tell this store, rather than have your phone do that for you, without consent, for every kind of entity 4 5 that could possibly be listening. 6 MS. WESTERMAN: There could be ways of going 7 about it, but to shut down the ability to innovate, the 8 ability to personally identify each person, 9 potentially, and be able to deliver value to me that I 10 want, in the future, that might be beneficial to 11 consumers. They might like that. 12 And so yes, you know, having that 13 transparency, making sure that they're aware, is 14 important, having that control is very important. But 15 at the end of the day, do retailers really want their 16 customers to be angry with them? I just don't think 17 I think they are trying to provide more benefit so. and I'd hate to see that shut down. 18 19 It has to be done in a way that creates 20 trust. There are ways -- there are good ways to do it and bad ways to do it, but to shut it down, I would 21 22 be concerned about. MR. SCHOEN: So I think it would be a lot of 23 24 fun to talk about hashing. And it may be kind of a distraction from the more fundamental privacy issues, 25

but I just wanted to say hashing doesn't work for the purpose of actually making yourself not know a MAC address or actually making yourself unable to recognize a MAC address or get the history of it.

5 And the blog post by Ed Felten that Ashkan 6 pointed to goes into this a bit. The problem is that 7 the space of possible MAC addresses is too small and, 8 as Ashkan eluded to, you could actually try every MAC 9 address as a candidate and put it to the hash and see 10 if it's that one.

11 So I actually want to issue a challenge to 12 the industry, if people think that MAC addresses are 13 somehow not readily identifiable, I want you to send me 14 a couple of hashed MAC addresses that you've actually 15 collected in the wild, of actual mobile devices, tell 16 me what the hashing algorithm was, and I'll crack them 17 and tell you what the MAC addresses were. I don't think it's technically challenging to do so, the space 18 19 of MAC addresses is just too small to make that 20 actually difficult to crack.

21 MR. RIESENBACH: And if that was done, what 22 would be the use of the MAC address? Because that 23 still doesn't encompass any personally identifiable 24 information. It would be something that is 25 identifiable to a device.

1 So you know, as I said, we try to look at 2 this through the filter of practicality and is there 3 some use that could actually be meaningfully harmful to 4 consumers, if even you were able to go through this 5 process and take the time and cost and resources to 6 actually go and find a MAC address?

7 MR. SCHOEN: I mean, I think the time and cost of resources is about a week of time on one 8 9 laptop. And I hope that people will take me up on this challenge, because I can actually do it and show that 10 11 it's a real possibility. And it's not like I'm going 12 to rent a supercomputer. It's like, I'm going to run 13 it on my laptop and brute-force it on one device, 14 that's my expectation.

15 You know, I think that a lot of people have 16 said that any given identifier is anonymous in some 17 sense because it doesn't have someone's name on it. And actually Latanya Sweeney was a pioneer in 18 19 questioning that. And there's been a whole academic 20 field within computer science talking about de-anonymization of data. So people have certain 21 22 intuitions about something being anonymous and you're 23 starting from a certain point and you're saying, well, 24 that's not someone's name, so I don't know who that is. 25 One of the underlying difficulties is that

you have something that, although it's not someone's 1 2 name, is unique. And it is unique in all the world, as 3 a MAC address is. And so if you have some 4 circumstances where you have some opportunity to 5 observe that thing, or some database that contains that 6 thing, along with other data, then that can be 7 combined. And we like to say that de-anonymization is 8 really a one-way street. You can go down the 9 de-anonymization street and then the anonymity has 10 been lost.

11 So I know that, with this code of conduct, 12 the part of the industry that's represented here is 13 very solicitous about the idea that they don't actually 14 want to know who you are and they are not actually 15 going to make efforts to know who you are. I think 16 Ashkan's presentation referred to the CVS app and 17 pointed to the fact that there are a lot of pressures 18 to do that and there are a lot of companies that will 19 be interested in doing that. And they may not even be 20 companies that see themselves as part of this 21 particular analytics industry or that see the code of 22 conduct as even relevant to them. But Ashkan has 23 already demonstrated on his slide that there are 24 companies that are collecting MAC addresses from within 25 apps. And those companies absolutely will know the

identity, in the classic sense, of the person to whom
 that MAC address relates.

And they are making those associations because they are interested for their commercial reasons or whatever reasons. And those associations, technically, are very easy for app developers to make if they're interested in doing it.

8 So there's a prospect. And it's not a 9 prospect again, that these companies on this panel are interested in doing for their business purposes, but 10 11 it's a prospect that other parts of the industry will 12 be interested in, I think, which is converging 13 different kinds of analytics and converging different 14 kinds of data sets and saying, well, if we have the 15 ability to know your off-line identity and your online 16 identity and how those relate, why wouldn't we do that? 17 And again, these people on the panel have businesses that don't rely on that and they don't do that and I 18 19 think that's great. But I think that there are other 20 parts of the industry that say, well, if we have that capability to make those associations, why not? 21 MS. WESTERMAN: Well, and I guess I get 22

23 concerned, too, when I think about the potential for 24 data and collection and analytics being good or bad. I 25 mean, data in and of itself isn't good or bad.

Analytics isn't good or bad. It can be how it's used. 1 2 And we did and interesting study recently 3 where we asked people, let's say a child is tracked 4 from 5-years-old on. Everything they did for school 5 was put out there and analyzed. And let's say there 6 was algorithms that were written, this is hypothetical, 7 to figure out that kids who spelled poorly and liked the hamster dance on YouTube would do better at UCLA 8 9 versus University of Michigan. So let's say this 10 happened.

11 When we asked parents and we said, if you 12 could have that information to figure out which school 13 your kid should apply to, people loved the idea. When 14 we asked the same question, well, what if the schools 15 used that to admit students, people hated the idea. 16 So the concept that the data itself being 17 collected is bad, that the algorithms are bad, to me it 18 just -- to me, it concerns me that we're limiting 19 ourselves in the future for what could be innovation. 20 There is definitely boundaries. People care, right? And we have to make sure we understand those matters in 21 22 the context and design within it, but just to shut it 23 off completely and say that we shouldn't be doing this, 24 and everyone always wants to be anonymous, really 25 limits the future of potentially giving more value to

1 people. So it just -- it concerns us.

2	MR. SCHOEN: Well, the privacy community, I
3	think, really has a consent model where the distinction
4	is consent. And the default for the privacy community
5	is that people don't know sensitive personal
6	information about you, unless you decide to share it
7	with them for purposes that you understand.
8	And I think that's a good norm and that's an
9	appropriate norm and it's not a norm that very many
10	areas of technology are respecting today, whether this
11	area of technology or others.
12	MS. WESTERMAN: And people want choice, you're
13	right. Consent needs to be sorry. So you know, you
14	have to make your consumers aware, you need that
15	transparency. They don't like to be surprised, they
16	want to know what's happening. And they do want to
17	have choice, if they care.
18	But I think, you know, the idea that
19	everybody wants to be anonymous and that nothing should
20	be collected, that's my concern. We might limit
21	ourselves.
22	MR. SCHOEN: If you have someone who realizes
23	some day that they didn't want something to be known
24	from, say, a year ago, that they didn't even realize
25	technologically could be known, it's a bit late for

1 them to go back and erase that data, which is 2 considered the property of the person who observed it, 3 typically. It's a bit late for them to back and say, oh, I didn't know that you could know that about me 4 5 about what I did a year ago, about who I was with, where I 6 was with, what I was doing. Now regret it, now that 7 you know it and I want you to erase it. Well, it's a 8 little late for that. 9 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Great, thank you. So I think everybody has made some great points about, you 10 11 know, some of the differences, you know, if this information were to become identifiable or, you know, 12 13 whether it may become identifiable. 14 But we want to take a step back for a minute 15 and talk about, you know, what is going on mainly right 16 now, which seems to be the aggregated analytics and 17 transparency around that. So what we want to find out, 18 are stores that are using that, the aggregated 19 analytics, notifying their customers right now? 20 MR. TINLEY: Well, with our clients, it's part of the code of conduct, they are incorporating it 21 22 into signage within stores. And they are doing that in 23 different ways, either existing signage that is being

re-done with information being put in or in other ways

25 at customer service.

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1 We've had conversations with store managers 2 that, if there's a question that comes up, we are 3 helping them to make sure that they can address and answer those questions as well. You know, it's not 4 5 a -- there is transparency. They do want consumers to 6 understand and realize, but there is, again, the 7 diversion of you are collecting something personal 8 about me just because you see my MAC address.

9 You can't send an offer to a device just because you have a MAC address. You have to have 10 11 something else to deliver and that means that they've 12 opted into it, so they are cognizant of that. But 13 yeah, they are looking at signage and putting up 14 signage and we are recommending different signage. 15 There is a smart store privacy -- or smart store logo, 16 there's different things. And Ilana is working on 17 things to help move that along so that, more and more, 18 that's being adopted.

MR. DUNCAN: I have to step in here because, although I appreciate debate about the signage or the approach and the various elements that might go into this proposed code, on behalf of the retail industry, I have to say that the overwhelming majority of the industry is not at a point that we think that this code has all of the elements that we think are necessary or

1 appropriate.

2 Just using the example I gave earlier, in 3 terms of heat mapping for purposes of shortening checkout lines is not something that we think is 4 5 necessary to be over-signing in the stores, especially 6 if we have evidence indicating that most consumers 7 aren't reading most signs anyway. To suddenly 8 proliferate whole bunches of new signs, either for this 9 technology or for other technology that's used to 10 accomplish essentially the same thing, strikes us as 11 perhaps a bridge too far at this point, in light of 12 what's actually happening. 13 MR. RIESENBACH: There's certainly an issue 14 where it's early in this game, it's constantly 15 evolving, and the approach that we've taken within the 16 industry is, as I said earlier, we're not going to sit 17 here today and say this code or what we're doing is the perfect solution. 18 19 But we felt that there is a lot of confusion 20 out in the marketplace and this is a good first step. And the retailers that we're working with, and I've 21 22 heard that from others in the industry as well, are 23 asking for ways to inform, not only their consumers, but 24 even their employees, so their employees are aware of 25 what they're doing.

1 And so we recognize that this is not the 2 ideal perfect solution forever and there may be, to 3 Mallory's point, many ways that we should be doing it, in a much broader sense, in conjunction with all 4 5 possible technologies, in conjunction with all 6 retailers, but that is something that, for practical 7 purposes, we could probably be talking about five years 8 from today.

9 So our attitude has been, let's get as far as 10 we can right now. Let's get something out into the 11 marketplace that shows positive intent, positive steps, 12 and what we can do today as an industry. So that's 13 been the approach.

MS. WESTERMAN: And I would say the best way we see is that implicit awareness. If we can do more of that, creating that value for consumers.

17 So I have an app, for example, that knows 18 where I'm at and gives me value for it. Then all of 19 the sudden, if they use that information to do heat 20 maps and make the lines shorter, people are very happy 21 about that, that's fine. They are aware that you have 22 the information and you're using it for good.

I think trying to get people to stop and pay attention is always going to be difficult, especially when there is so much going on in the retail space.

1 But I think there could be a win-win here, in that the 2 more functionality that comes online, that uses this 3 information and helps consumers, then you've created 4 awareness about the notice and you've created an 5 environment that helps the retailers and the consumers. 6 And then what happens is, you get the ambient awareness 7 of the notice that's there so people, if it's placed 8 properly, once they are aware that it's happening, if 9 they care, then they become aware that, okay, here's a 10 store where I don't want them to have it and then I can 11 opt-out.

But in general, you know, I think the 12 13 implicit awareness is the right first step to take. 14 MS. ANDERSON: So my understanding from Jim 15 and Glenn is that you are already taking steps to make 16 explicit the notices in your current locations. So your retailers, Jim, are they -- they are putting up 17 18 physical signage in the stores? Are they putting them 19 at the registers, are they putting them in the windows? 20 And then Glenn, for you, I think that you were saying that a lot of your clients are bigger clients, 21 22 like shopping malls and airports, so do you have an 23 example of where that signage might be and how 24 consumers might notice it?

25

MR. RIESENBACH: Well, we are working with

retailers, knowing that we as an industry are working 1 2 to develop a set of signage and visual cues that we are 3 planning to carry across all retailers and across all 4 of these companies. We've been working on an interim 5 basis to put some signage up, but we have also 6 essentially informed our retail partners that we are 7 working on something that we will be delivering and 8 that's something that's part of the coalition that 9 we've put together and working with Ilana to develop. 10 So we are expecting that it's going to become 11 much more prevalent as we get through this year. 12 MR. TINLEY: And we're much the same, we've 13 got some our clients that they have existing signage on 14 the wall that will talk about different privacy policies or different codes of conduct that the mall 15 16 owner or operator will abide by in, you know, different 17 wings of the mall. And in most cases, it's being added 18 as one of those items in there. 19 MS. KOULOUSIAS: And so we've talked a little bit about whether notices are being provided and where

bit about whether notices are being provided and where they might be being provided, and so the question that I wanted to raise for everybody is, what are the goals of the notice? What are the important pieces of information that need to be conveyed to consumers? MS. WESTERMAN: Well, you know, what consumers

1 care about is what information is being collected and 2 how is it being used.

And so if you are asking someone to make a choice about something, they need to understand the implications. And as you saw in some of the videos, frequently it is something that they don't care so much about or if it's being used to streamline things, they are okay with it.

9 There are other things they care a lot more 10 about, so if those things were being collected, we 11 would be much more strongly advocating for different 12 types of explicit-awareness type notice.

13 But one thing I would like to bring up is the 14 mall areas and that's something that we didn't 15 research, that would be the next step. Since we're 16 seeing many more phones out in the mall areas, we're 17 seeing people having more attention paid in the mall 18 areas, that might actually be a place where you could 19 get more awareness of signage. I don't have the data 20 right now, so I don't know, but that would be a next step to look at, is that a place where we could place 21 22 them.

23 MR. RIESENBACH: The other thing is that 24 there are ways, and we are experimenting with this, 25 that the signage can actually convey consumer benefit.

1 And so one instance where we are doing this right now 2 is in airports, where the TSA queues can backup and you 3 can have hundreds of people in line, but there can be 4 three different TSA queues at the same airport.

5 So what we're doing and, as I said, we're 6 testing this in a number of cases, is we are using our 7 methodology to put big monitors up at the beginning of 8 each of the TSA queues to tell the consumer, when they 9 get there, what's the wait time in this line. It says, 10 line one, 12 minutes, but line two is 8 minutes and 11 line three is 4 minutes. So it's a self-regulating 12 path for consumers to actually benefit and see how they 13 can save time at an airport. And we are using the same 14 approach in many cases, as I mentioned earlier, in 15 grocery stores. And that can be a very similar 16 approach.

So there are some direct consumer benefitsthat tie into the signage and the disclosure.

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Thanks. And so one of the things that you mentioned before is that, you know, with this code of conduct, that consumers have the ability to opt-out. Is that ability to opt-out something that is mentioned in any of the notices that are being put in stores?

25

MR. TINLEY: Yes, as part of the signage or

verbiage that is being put up, there is a website
 address in most cases, or in all cases right now, to be
 able to go and do that.

And as Ashkan pointed out, and as I think we all understand, that is not the most seamless -- there is not a seamless way to be able to do it, but it is a way to do it that does give consumers the option to do so.

9 We've also had emails from people who have 10 just said, you know, I've seen a sign and here's an 11 email, could you please remove me? And we do so and we 12 respond to the email immediately to say that this has 13 been done. So there are ways to do it and there is a 14 web address or an email being applied in there.

MR. RIESENBACH: I think we've all learned, and Ilana may testify, that as soon as you start to try to convey too many messages with too much information and too many words on a sign, you essentially lose the chance of actually communicating effectively.

20 So what we're trying to do is minimize the 21 amount of text, maximize the amount of visual impact, 22 as well as giving a very easy way for consumers to know 23 where to go to find that information.

24 MS. ANDERSON: We've gotten a lot of 25 questions about where people can find the code online. I don't know if any of you have the URL with you that we can provide? But we would like to be able to do that.

And then also if one of you can talk a little bit more about how the opt-out actually works, how consumers access it, once they get to the website, what do they have to do?

8 MR. RIESENBACH: We are working with an 9 organization called The Future of Privacy and they are 10 a Washington-based think tank and they've helped us to 11 put this group together and develop the code. And the 12 code is actually live on their site. Now, all of the 13 companies that are participating are also putting this 14 live on our sites as well.

And then, of course, within the opt-out there's going to be the information, when people go into that, if they choose to opt-out, there's much more information. There's a whole frequently asked questions area that talks about the code.

20 MS. ANDERSON: Instructing you on how to find 21 --

MR. RIESENBACH: Yeah.
MS. ANDERSON: -- your MAC address and enter
it and all of that? Okay.
MS. KOULOUSIAS: Seth, so we wanted to go

back to some of the points that you have actually made a little bit earlier, some of the concerns that you had about persistent identifiers and, you know, how they are being broadcast from the phones.

5 And what I am wondering is, you know, given 6 the fact that the MAC address is being broadcast from 7 the phone right now, that it is what's going on, what 8 are your thoughts on transparency and choices for 9 consumers around that and why it's needed and ways to 10 do that?

MR. SCHOEN: I mean, I think that the people who are making these devices, in a sense, are, as I said earlier, more to blame for the prospect of people randomly knowing where you are at any given moment and situation and place.

16 I guess I'd like to see device makers warning 17 people, you know, when you use wi-fi or when you have 18 wi-fi on, the wi-fi networks that you are on or near can recognize you. I agree that there is a very 19 20 challenging question about how to convey information 21 and how to get people to pay attention to it, whether 22 they are in a store or whether they are opening their 23 cell phone for the first time. And I don't presume to 24 know the best way to go about conveying that, but I'd 25 like to see device makers actually warning people, you

1 know, people will know where this device is when you
2 use it as intended, and these are some of the kinds of
3 people who can know that. So that's something that I'd
4 like to see.

5 I certainly think that, if there's a store or 6 somewhere that's doing this, that putting up a sign, as 7 we've just been talking about, is an appropriate thing 8 to do in that context, that it's a sensible thing to 9 warn people and to give people an opt-out.

10 I guess as I said earlier, thinking of the 11 app that Ashkan found that is collecting MAC addresses, 12 I'm much less concerned about the relatively 13 responsible people who are affirmatively interested in 14 warning people and in giving people an opt-out and in 15 giving people more control. And I'm more concerned 16 about the notion that, there's really such a low 17 barrier to entry for location tracking.

For those of you who were here in time to see the demo earlier, that demo of location tracking was done on an ordinary laptop with very ordinary hardware. It wasn't done with some super high-tech thing that is only available from going into research labs or something. It's an ordinary laptop. And in fact, Dr. Sweeney was saying that she

And in fact, Dr. Sweeney was saying that she had to actively program it not to track everyone who

1 walked by and that that was an actual effort that she
2 had to go to to make sure that it wouldn't track all of
3 you as you walked into the building.

4 So the barrier to entry for doing fairly 5 involved tracking is relatively low and there are a lot 6 of different kinds of entities that could undertake it, 7 not just entities who have signed on to the code or 8 that are trying to put up signs and inform people.

9 MR. DUNCAN: May I just add on to what Seth 10 was saying here? Look, this is relatively new 11 technology. There are some advantages to retailers and 12 to our customers from its use, but it's not so 13 pervasive that it is critical to retailers operations.

We would like to see it grow and we are not interested in seeing technology arrested, I agree with Ilana on that; however, if device manufacturers wanted to put a kill button on cell phones, that would be something that you wouldn't find the retail industry objecting to as a general proposition.

20 MR. SCHOEN: I think the more concretely 21 useful thing would be a button that says "Change my MAC 22 address." And I don't think that that -- I think it 23 has substantial privacy benefits and I think it has 24 very few adverse technical consequences. And I think 25 for the statistical purposes, at least in terms of dwell time, wait time, not necessarily in terms of
 repeat visits, you would still be able to do that.

3 So certainly if we are thinking about what 4 button we'd like to have, I'd like to see the "Change 5 My MAC Address" button. Now it does mean that you 6 wouldn't get the repeat visits or the repeat visits 7 data would be a little bit less accurate, but for the 8 dwell time and wait time, you could still get that.

9 MR. TINLEY: Seth, I also just wanted make a point that comes back to the CVS app is, within an app, 10 11 when an app is downloaded, and Apple did this and 12 Google is actually doing it with their new versions of 13 Android, the MAC address is actually wiped out, so 14 there is actually no MAC address broadcast when you are 15 in the Google or Apple, I call it their ecosystem. The 16 MAC address is actually not transmitted, it is a 02 and a series of zeros. Apple and Google apply an 17 identifier, unique identifier, to the application or to 18 19 the device. So then, because Jim and myself and 20 others, we live outside of that ecosystem and we see that MAC address, we could not even then combine, even 21 22 if we technologically wanted to, we could not combine 23 the application that someone has and a MAC address to 24 the generic MAC address, or the MAC address that we're capturing. There's no way for us to even combine 25

1 those.

2	So again it even, from our standpoint,
3	separates the ability to collect anything personally
4	identifiable or anything along those lines, it puts
5	another, we'll call it a wedge, in there as a
6	protection against that and against profiling and the
7	other sort of negative connotations of those things.
8	MR. SCHOEN: So I think it's very important
9	that mobile operating system developers should prevent
10	applications from reading the MAC address as well as
11	other identifiers.
12	MR. TINLEY: Well Apple and Google did that.
13	MR. SCHOEN: And so there is a trend in that
14	direction in recent mobile OS versions and I think
15	that's great and I think that's very welcome.
16	I think a bigger picture indication, from
17	what Ashkan found, is that there were app developers
18	who were willing to try to use that information, if
19	they had access to it. And that suggests to me that,
20	whoever created that app is willing to try to use other
21	technical means to circumvent that privacy measure.
22	And my prediction is that there are other
23	technical means that are available we can talk
24	about, and I think it should be a separate conversation
25	later, I think there are other technical means that

will be found to circumvent that privacy measure and do
 that reconnection of MAC address and identity.

3 So it's not necessarily that it's going to be 4 the particular way that Ashkan found that the CVS app 5 is doing it, which I agree, mobile OS developers are 6 trying to plug that hole. It's that there is the 7 willingness, in some parts of the industry, to try to 8 make those associations. And I think we are going to 9 see that, technologically, in this context, there's a 10 will, there's a way. 11 MS. WESTERMAN: One thing that I'm also kind of 12 concerned about is that we are over simplifying the 13 problem. And so when you talk to people about 14 anonymity, there are definitely times when we want to 15 be anonymous. But there's also times when we're okay

16 with you kind of knowing who we are in aggregate. And 17 there's also times when we actually want you to know 18 who we are.

19 So an example of this is like when you're 20 checking out in a store and you don't want your credit 21 card taken, do you want to personally be identified? 22 Yeah. People don't sign the back of credit cards, they 23 want you to look at their ID. There are times when we 24 really do want that to be in place. And there's other 25 times when we want to be anonymous.

1 So I think it's a difficult design problem 2 and we have to take a step back and look at, what do 3 consumers really want, what do they really care about, and 4 not oversimplify a solution. And not assume it's going to 5 happen overnight either, all working toward that 6 positive outcome, but we have to first understand what 7 people care about. 8 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Seth, I just wanted to 9 follow up quickly on a point that you had made. When 10 you were talking about the ability to possibly reset a 11 MAC address, you know, one of the things that might be 12 lost would be the new versus returning visitors. 13 And so what I wanted to just hear briefly 14 about is, you know, to what extent do you think the 15 privacy concerns differ if you're looking just at, you 16 know, the current location versus that location over 17 time, with the returning visitors? MR. SCHOEN: Well, I think the location over 18 19 time, you know, Ilana alluded to the idea that it's 20 something people that people are anxious about. And I 21 think people have very imperfect memories and machines 22 have perfect memories. And people often don't even 23 remember the sensitivity, or the potential sensitivity, 24 of things that they've done or the places that they've 25 been.

An amazing example that someone in this field gave me a few years ago is that you can use location to detect if people are having an extramarital affair because certain people spent the night in the same place, you observed in the place in the evening and you observed them in the place in the morning. And that sort of falls out of location accidentally.

8 Obviously, no one has started a company to 9 detect if people are having extramarital affairs using 10 location data, but people's sort of imperfect memories 11 make them not even see the sensitivity in the location 12 trail that they leave behind and the data trail they 13 leave behind. And for that reason, Bruce Schneier has 14 compared data trails to a kind of pollution, because 15 you can't necessarily see it and you're not necessarily 16 harmed by it in the short-term.

17 So I think the inferences that are sensitive, 18 that can be drawn from people's locations, clearly are 19 much more extreme over the long-term, in terms of 20 people's habits and habitual activity. And if someone 21 goes to a particular place of worship every weekend, 22 you conclude that they probably are a member there and 23 they probably actually belong to a particular religious group, as opposed to someone who was once observed 24 25 apparently at that place of worship. Well, maybe they

1 were attending a musical concert or something.

2 So all of these things, as you get the 3 overall picture of someone's life, of someone's habits, 4 of someone's associations, are much more significant 5 over time. And I agree that there's not that much 6 sensitivity in that momentary observation, oh, this 7 person went to the store on this one day. That's not 8 really very sensitive at all. But this person goes to 9 this kind of place, oh this person knows this person 10 because they were seen together, oh this person is in 11 an intimate relationship with this person because they 12 were seen together in certain kinds of places. That's 13 much more sensitive and that's information that falls 14 out, over time.

15

MS. KOULOUSIAS: Great.

16 MR. TINLEY: Seth, just also -- I just wanted to follow up on that. The inference is that, if you 17 18 were talking about our company, we would have to have 19 our sensors installed at all of the hotels, every place 20 of worship. That we would have to have -- that we 21 would be everywhere, which I'm wonderful to have that 22 happen, from a business standpoint, but the reality of 23 it happening is -- we're reaching a little bit, in 24 terms of, you know, the place of worship would have been hired us to install our sensors within there, to 25

1 then observe their visitors every Sunday to find out 2 who is coming every Sunday or what percentage of them 3 are coming every Sunday. If they were then to sort of use that -- it's their data to use. They wouldn't use 4 5 that to then profile their own people. So it's just --6 and this is where sometimes it gets -- you can go a 7 little -- we can get where there is so much data being collected, and there is a lot of data being collected 8 9 and obviously protection of that data is paramount, but 10 there is things required to have connections drawn. 11 And in almost all cases, those things that are used to connect those things are not connected at all and never 12 13 could be or never will be. 14 MR. SCHOEN: So I would absolutely agree that 15 the current scale of commercial location analytics is not 16 dense enough to make some of the most extreme privacy-17 invasive inferences, because you don't have sensors in a lot of the places that people are most anxious about people 18

19 knowing that they've been, and you may never have sensors in 20 those places.

I guess it's a big picture concern and it's a long-term concern about, as you get more uses of location by more kinds of entities, some of those things actually will show up in some of those sensory networks.

And in the online world, those are already 1 2 showing up in the sense that websites are able to get 3 that from an IP address. And I was discussing with 4 Ashkan, there are companies that are trying to bridge 5 the IP address and physical location both. 6 So if you look at the big picture of the 7 industry, I think some of those concerns can develop 8 over time. 9 MS. KOULOUSIAS: Thanks. We really hate to cut off the conversation, but we are basically out of 10 11 time. 12 We want to give everybody just 15 seconds 13 each to just kind of give your closing thoughts on 14 this, so we can start down at the end with Glenn. 15 MR. TINLEY: I don't think -- just to 16 reiterate, we agree and support 100 percent that consumer privacy is, again, paramount to everything 17 18 that is being done. 19 I think that, as an industry, we actually 20 stepped up and said, look, we understand this and we 21 want to develop a code of conduct that is at least a 22 starting point and that can help bridge some of the 23 next timeframe. 24 My only caution is the market confusion over what 25 is within an app that somebody is downloading and using

on a daily basis, that they want to use, that is not even giving out a MAC address, versus what is being observed on ongoing basis to help retailers with customer experience and just compete in that more online world.

6 MR. DUNCAN: I think I'll conclude as I began 7 by saying that this ultimately, at least in the retail 8 environment, is going to come down to a matter of 9 trust. Rather than talking about notice for 10 observations, we should be talking about notice for 11 particularized uses that might be problematic.

12 And whether a use is problematic will depend 13 upon the relationship of the customer with the environment 14 they're in. In the store environment, for the reasons I 15 said before, it's likely that the store is going to find, 16 try very hard, to find that right balance. In a more open 17 environment, say in a mall where the customer doesn't have a 18 relationship, or perhaps at an airport, there may be a 19 different paradigm that applies.

20 But at least from our perspective, trust is 21 the key.

22 MR. SCHOEN: So I would just like to remind 23 everybody again that Dr. Sweeney set up that demonstration 24 on an ordinary laptop and had to actively program 25 it not to collect all of your MAC addresses. And if

she hadn't actively programmed it that way, then all of 1 2 your devices that have wi-fi interfaces enabled would 3 have an observation in that laptop, saying that you 4 were here at this time. And maybe it's not very 5 sensitive to you that you were here at this workshop at 6 this time, but maybe there's some place or some 7 interaction or some relationship that you wouldn't 8 actually like someone to be able to observe in that 9 way.

10 And so I think, you know, these statistical 11 and aggregate applications of location analytics are 12 not the scariest ones, from a privacy point of view. 13 Obviously, the profiling analytics that we haven't seen 14 deployed commercially so much to date are dramatically 15 scarier.

16 But I think the barriers to entry really are 17 extremely low. And I think to the extent that people 18 want their location to be used to provide services to 19 them and they want people to know their location, it's 20 really very technically easy to do that in a consensual 21 way by having people install applications that share 22 their location in a defined way for a particular 23 purpose. And we already have a lot of applications 24 that do that. So I think we should be looking to that 25 as the model for privacy protective use of location. I

am looking for technical means, like changing MAC 1 2 addresses, that actually don't require people to have 3 their devices be observable and recognizable in every 4 circumstance by everyone with a laptop. 5 MR. RIESENBACH: I think it's early in a rapidly evolving industry, from a technology 6 7 standpoint, and it's important for us to keep in mind 8 what's theoretically possible from what's practical and 9 actionable and market driven in today's world. 10 And so I don't dispute some of the hypothetical 11 possibilities down the road, but you know, we are in the 12 business of helping real brick-and-mortar retailers 13 compete more effectively and serve their customers better 14 today and that's where we keep our focus. 15 And absolutely we have to continue to evolve 16 our technology, evolve our conduct, but at the end of 17 the day, I think market forces prevail and -- because 18 those retailers or other businesses that violate the 19 trust of their consumers will be punished by the 20 marketplace more than anything else. 21 And so I don't think that the reality is is 22 that some of the worst case scenarios will come to be, 23 because I don't think that the market will allow it. 24 MS. WESTERMAN: Yeah. And I think I always 25 look at it from the customer's perspective, from the

1 user's perspective. And so they, you know, they trust 2 retailers right now. And if you look at it from a 3 retailer's perspective, are they going to try to compromise that trust? Why would they want to do that? 4 5 I mean, do they want their customers to come back? 6 Sure. Do they want to provide better goods and 7 services for them? Yeah. I mean, everyone is trying 8 to help each other in this particular environment.

9 And that doesn't mean, I think, to Seth's 10 point, that there might not be other areas where harm 11 can be done, but at the end of the day, the collection 12 of the information and the actual algorithms, are those 13 bad things? I don't think so. It's the outcome.

14 And so I think we just have to always try to 15 understand, you know, what do consumers really care 16 about? Provide that transparency so they know if it 17 benefits them or not so they can make a choice. And 18 realize that we're at the beginning. And to your 19 point, that this is a hard problem, trying to get 20 people's attention, trying to provide that 21 transparency. It's not going to happen overnight. 22 We're going to do it, but it's a process, it's a design 23 process.

MS. ANDERSON: Thank you all very much.
Thank you to all of our panelists for joining us today,

1 this has been a great discussion. Thank you to all of 2 you for participating and thanks to those who have been 3 viewing via webcast.

We hope you've enjoyed the discussion today and we'd like to take this opportunity to remind everyone that we are accepting public comments on this topic until March 19. You can find instructions for submission on the web page for this seminar.

9 Also, for our in-person audience, our Chief 10 Technologist, Latanya Sweeney, will be conducting her 11 demonstration again in the hallway, just outside of 12 this conference center, so if you didn't get a chance 13 to see it on the way in, you can go and see that 14 now.

And finally, we'd like to remind you that this was the first in a series of three spring privacy series. The second will be on alternative scoring and that will take place here on the March 19th. The third will be on consumer generated and controlled health data and that will take place on May 7th. Thank you all.

22 (Whereupon, the proceedings23 concluded at 12:05 p.m.)
1	State of Maryland, County of Harford, to wit:
2	
3	I STEPHANIE M. GILLEY, a Notary Public of
4	the State of Maryland, County of Harford, do hereby
5	certify that the within-named witness did appear at
6	the time and place herein set out.
7	I further certify that the proceedings
8	were recorded verbatim by me and this transcript is
9	a true and accurate record of the proceedings.
10	I further certify that I am not of counsel
11	to any of the parties, nor in any way interested in
12	the outcome of this action.
13	As witness my hand and notarial seal this
14	day of, 2013.
15	
16	
17	STEPHANIE M. GILLEY
18	NOTARY PUBLIC
19	
20	
21	My Commission expires on February 25, 2017.
22	
23	
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